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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on childhood obesity. The first
essay, “What Money Can Buy: Family Income and Childhood Obesity” in-
vestigates the relationship between family income and childhood obesity us-
ing the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99
(ECLS-K). In this essay I report three new findings. First, family income
and childhood obesity are negatively correlated overall but among children
from very low-income families they are positively correlated. Second, the
negative association between family income and Body Mass Index (BMI) is
especially strong and significant among high-BMI children. Third, the gap in
obesity rates between children from low- and high-income families increases
as children age. I further investigate potential factors that might contribute
to a rapid increase in obesity rates among low-income children. I find that
their faster weight gain, rather than their slower height growth, is a greater
contributor to rapid BMI growth over time. On the other hand, I also find
that faster weight gain by low-income children cannot be attributed to any
single factor, such as participation in school meal programs, parental char-
acteristics, or individual characteristics. The findings add to the current
obesity debate by demonstrating that the key to curbing childhood obesity
may lie in factors generating different obesity rates across income levels.
In the second essay, “Does the Earned Income Tax Credit Increase Chil-
dren’s Weight? The Impact of Policy-Driven Income on Childhood Obesity”,
I exploit substantial increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to
study how a policy-driven change in family income affects childhood obesity.
In contrast to a widely accepted belief, I find that income has an adverse ef-
fect on children’s weight. My difference-in-difference estimates indicate that
the probability of being obese increased more among children whose families
experienced a greater income shock. Moreover, instrumental variable esti-
mates demonstrate that a $1,000 increase in policy-driven income leads to a
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0.5-percentage point increase in obesity rates. The finding suggests that a
non-health social safety net program such as the EITC could have unintended
negative side effects.
In the third essay, “The Impact of Maternal Employment on Children’s
Adiposity: Evidence from the China’s Labor Policy Reform”, we provide
new evidence on the effect of maternal employment on childhood adiposity
using the longitudinal survey data from the China Health and Nutrition Sur-
vey (CHNS). Our main identification strategy relies on the 1995 legislative
change to the labor regulations in China that reduced the number of working
days from six to five days a week without changing workers’ wages. While
maternal employment and childhood obesity in China exhibits the same pos-
itive association as in the US, our difference-in-difference estimate presents
a different picture. Comparing children whose mothers are wage earners to
those whose mothers are self-employed, we find that a reduction in maternal
labor supply led to children’s weight gain. Such weight gain was beneficial
for those who were previously underweight but harmful to those who became
overweight. Further investigation reveals that the effect is stronger among
children who are male, from low-socioeconomic households, and from urban
areas.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
My dissertation explores the economic causes of childhood obesity and more
specifically the causal effect of family income and maternal employment on
childhood obesity. The prevalence of obesity among children in the United
States has tripled over the past three decades and currently about one in
five children are obese. The rapid increase in obesity rate among children is
not only exhibited in a developed country like the United States but also in
a developing country like China. A closer look at the phenomenon reveals
disproportionately high obesity rates among children from low-socioeconomic
families. However, we have only a rudimentary understanding of the role
family’s socioeconomic status plays in causing childhood obesity. In this
dissertation, I provide empirical evidence on factors that could potentially
contribute to childhood obesity.
The first essay of my dissertation, “What Money Can Buy: Family Income
and Childhood Obesity” documents the complex nature of the relationship
between family income and childhood obesity using detailed panel data.1
I bring three new sets of facts to light: First, I show that family income
is positively correlated with childhood obesity for very low-income families,
while the relationship is negative for families in all other income ranges.
Thus, increasing income through government transfer programs, a booming
economy, or other means could potentially raise or lower the probability
of obesity, depending on which children are affected. Second, as children
age, the difference in obesity rates between children from low-income and
high-income families increases. This is consistent with low income having a
cumulative effect on children’s obesity status and is also consistent with a
larger body of work that shows that income gradients in health and cognitive
1The article has been published in the Economics and Human Biology and is included
as a part of the dissertation with a permission from the Elsevier to reprint under a scholarly
or personal purpose.
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development emerge slowly and steadily throughout childhood (Case et al.,
2002; Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Fryer and Levitt, 2006). Finally, I show that
factors such as parental employment, parental behaviors, and school meal
programs cannot explain the increasing gap.
The second essay, “Does the Earned Income Tax Credit Increase Children’s
Weight? The Impact of Policy-Driven Income on Childhood Obesity” studies
whether the observed correlation between family income and childhood obe-
sity that I document in the first essay is indeed causal. Despite various papers
on childhood obesity, few studies have credibly estimated the causal effect of
family income, mainly due to difficulties in addressing potential confounding
factors. For instance, if low-income parents have less knowledge of healthy
eating habits and ways to control weight, then their children may end up
more obese than children from higher-income families. In this case, income
is correlated with obesity, but increasing family income without changing
parents’ knowledge base would not affect the obesity rates. To measure the
causal effect of income, one must employ an econometric strategy beyond the
commonly used ordinary least squares regression method.
To address the potential bias, I utilize the exogenous income changes stem-
ming from the large increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) dur-
ing the 1990s.2 The increased generosity of benefit raised family income
and employment rates among low-income families. Crucially for my study,
the policy changes are arguably unrelated to unobserved or unmeasurable
factors that affect children’s body weight, which allows me to estimate the
causal effect of income on children’s body weight. Using a panel of children
matched to their mothers from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979, the descriptive results demonstrate that a negative relationship exists
between childhood obesity and family income. However, when I use the afore-
mentioned exogenous variations in family income, I find that an increase in
income actually raises childhood obesity rates. Furthermore, an estimation
of income effect by subgroups indicates that the obesity rates of younger
children and children from more disadvantaged backgrounds are influenced
more by the income changes.
2The EITC is currently the largest cash-transfer program in the United States targeted
towards low-income adults. It effectively provides an income supplement to low-income,
working adults, with larger payments to people with children. In 1990, the maximum
EITC payment was $953 (in nominal dollars). By 2000, the maximum had increased to
$2,210 for a family with one child and $3,888 for a family with two or more children.
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In the third essay, “The Impact of Maternal Employment on Children’s
Adiposity: Evidence from the China’s Labor Policy Reform”, I study the im-
pact of maternal employment on children’s weight. One of the shortcomings
of the previous essay is that it is difficult to disentangle the effect of family
income from that of maternal employment. Therefore, in the third essay, I
attempt to separate the role of maternal employment from income in caus-
ing childhood obesity. In the mid-1990s, Chinese government reformed labor
policy to restrict the maximum number of work hours. The reform effectively
reduced the number of hour worked for workers employed in both private and
public sectors but not for self-employed workers. Utilizing such a difference,
we investigate the difference in children’s adiposity outcome between those
with wage earning mothers and those with self-employed mothers. The main
result implies that a reduction in maternal employment induced children’s
weight gain. Mothers allocated their extra time to housework, which likely
generated children’s higher caloric intake. Children who are younger, male,
and from low-socioeconomic backgrounds are especially affected more by a
change in maternal employment.
Childhood obesity is a growing and a complex problem. A rapid increase
in obesity rates around the world in the past few decades increases urgency
to identify the causal factors behind obesity. A better understanding of
what generates a discrepancy in obesity rates among children is crucial since
it could both reveal a key to solving the current obesity epidemic and also
provide useful insights into the consequences of government transfer programs
that currently exist.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT MONEY CAN BUY: FAMILY
INCOME AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between family income and child-
hood obesity. The obesity rate in the United States has tripled over the
past three decades: Currently, about one third of adults and one fifth of
adolescents are obese. A closer look reveals a disproportionately high obe-
sity rate among racial minorities and low-income individuals.1 Accordingly,
public efforts to curb the rising obesity rate are often targeted at low-income
families. For instance, an initiative by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
called “Loving Your Family Feeding Their Future,” aims to help low-income
women and their children gain greater access to healthy food through nu-
trition education (USDA, 2012). Examining the relationship between family
income and childhood obesity could provide some useful insights into such
programs that specifically target low-income families.
Focusing on childhood obesity has several benefits over investigating adult
obesity. It alleviates the issue of reverse causality inherent in studying the re-
lationship between income and obesity. Although obesity can affect one’s own
income among adults (Kelly, 2014), this is not the case for children in most
developed countries, where children rarely work. Nevertheless, due to the
potential endogeneity of income, one must take precautions when inferring
causality from the relationship between family income and childhood obesity
observed here. On the other hand, findings pertaining to childhood obesity
can illuminate our understanding of adult obesity, since the relationship be-
tween income and adult weight has a precursor in childhood. In addition,
studying the relationship between family income and childhood obesity pro-
126.8% of Mexican-American adolescent boys are obese, compared to 16.7% of non-
Hispanic white boys. 29.2% of non-Hispanic black girls are obese, compared to 14.5% of
non-Hispanic white girls (Ogden and Carroll, 2010).
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vides important insights into the intergenerational transmission of wealth.
Obesity may be one of the important mechanisms through which intergener-
ational wealth is transmitted from parents to children: Low parental income
may increase the chance of a child being obese, which is likely to reduce a
child’s future income.2
Previous studies found a negative relationship between income and obe-
sity among youths (Anderson et al., 2009; Murasko, 2009; Murasko, 2013),
as well as a strengthening of that relationship over time (Murasko, 2013).
While this paper reaffirms those findings, it contributes to the literature by
exploring the heterogeneous nature of the relationship between family income
and childhood obesity. More specifically, the paper investigates how the rela-
tionship varies by family income levels, Body Mass Index (BMI) levels, race,
and gender. Moreover, the paper shows that the difference in obesity rates
among children from different income levels is not observed at a young age,
but develops over time. Relatedly, I investigate the potential mechanisms
behind this widening obesity gap. Several mechanisms, proposed by other
researchers to affect the overall obesity rate, are also tested. To my knowl-
edge, no study has investigated why low-income children’s weight increases
faster than high-income children’s.
Using the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of
1998-99 (ECLS-K), I provide three new findings. First, family income in-
creases the probability of childhood obesity for very poor families. Only when
family income exceeds the tenth percentile does income have a negative re-
lationship with children’s obesity rates. Second, quantile regression analysis
indicates that the relationship between income and obesity is stronger among
children with high BMI than those with lower BMI. Lastly, the relationship
between family income and childhood obesity becomes stronger as children
age. This phenomenon is exhibited by all racial and gender groups except
Hispanics. Further tests show that the faster weight gain by low-income chil-
dren cannot be attributed to differences in parental employment status or
parental behavior. Differences in school lunch participation rates and other
2Previous studies demonstrate that obese children are more likely to suffer from various
illnesses, such as diabetes or hypertension, and to enter adulthood with worse health
and less education than their non-obese peers (Cawley and Spiess, 2008). Research also
demonstrates that unhealthy and obese individuals tend to fare worse in both job and
marriage markets (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Averett and Korenman, 1996; Cawley,
2004; Wada and Tekin, 2010).
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individual time-invariant heterogeneities explain only a small portion of the
increasing gradient.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main
dataset used in this paper. The relationship between family income and
childhood obesity is closely examined in Section 3. In Section 4, the main
results are presented, and Section 5 discusses the findings in detail. Section
6 concludes.
2.2 Data
The main source of data is the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kinder-
garten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K). The ECLS-K is longitudinal survey data
collected by the U.S. Department of Education in an effort to better un-
derstand how children’s environments affect their development. The study
selected a nationally representative sample of children attending kindergarten
in 1998 and 1999 through a multistage probability sample design.3 The study
began its survey of a cohort in their kindergarten year and continued to collect
information from these children, their parents, teachers, and school adminis-
trators until the cohort reached eighth grade in 2007. During the nine-year
span, the survey was conducted seven times: fall and spring of kindergarten,
fall and spring of first grade, spring of third grade, spring of fifth grade,
and spring of eighth grade. I use five waves of data collected from spring of
kindergarten through eighth grade. Due to the complex survey design, I use
sample weights and analytic strategies for a proper estimation of the stan-
dard errors. I use longitudinal parental sample weights, since family income
is only reported through parent surveys. Furthermore, standard errors are
estimated using the paired jackknife replication method in Stata 12.1.4
The main strength of the ECLS-K is the reliability of its adiposity mea-
sures. In the ECLS-K, the height and weight of each child are directly mea-
sured twice by the interviewer during each survey, hence they are more accu-
rate than self-reported information generally available in other large datasets.
Obesity status is determined using the 2000 Centers for Disease Control
3See Tourangeau et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the data collection method.
4See Brown et al. (2007), Glenn (2009), and Tourangeau et al. (2009) for more discus-
sions on the standard error estimation.
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(CDC) sex- and age-specific growth chart.5 In Panel A of Table 2.1, the
proportion of obese children increases from 13 percent in kindergarten to 18
percent in eighth grade. The slight decrease in the average obesity rate from
fifth to eighth grade is likely due to a growth spurt.
In the ECLS-K, continuous family income is reported only during the chil-
dren’s kindergarten year. Starting with first grade, family income is given in
ranges of thirteen categories. Therefore, the inflation-adjusted middle value
of the income range is assigned for each child. In kindergarten, the average
family income is approximately 57,000 in year 1999 dollars, which is com-
parable to the national median income level from the 2000 Census.6 On
the other hand, since family income is self-reported, it suffers from classical
measurement error, and thus an attenuation bias. Therefore, the estimated
coefficient could be considered the lower bound of the true estimate.
2.3 Family Income and Childhood Obesity
2.3.1 Nonlinearity and the Increasing Gradient
The basic empirical framework for investigating the relationship between
family income and childhood obesity is given by
yit = f(Iit;α) +Xitβ + it,
where yit is either a dummy variable for child i’s obesity status or BMI at time
t, Iit is a child’s family income, Xit is a vector of individual characteristics,
such as gender, race, parents’ ages, and household size, and f(Iit;α) is an
unknown function of Iit with parameter α. For example, if we assume a
5Body Mass Index (BMI) is created using a standard formula of dividing weight in
kilograms by the square of height in meters (kg/m2). Although some literature categorizes
children with BMI between the 85th and the 95th percentile as “at risk of overweight”
and those with BMI greater than the 95th percentile as “overweight”, I follow a more
conventional definition of addressing the former as “overweight” and the latter as “obese”.
6The 2000 Census notes that the U.S. median income for 1999 was $42,000. The median
income for head of household aged 35-44 was $50,654, which is closer to the sample family
income in the ECLS-K (with the average father’s age of 37).
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linear relationship, f(Iit;α) = αIit.
7 The parameter of interest is α, which
characterizes the relationship between Iit and yit.
When BMI or obesity status is regressed on family income, the estimated
coefficient on income is negative. This confirms a widely accepted belief
regarding the relationship between family income and childhood obesity.
Imposing a linear relationship, however, may be too restrictive. Philipson
and Posner (1999, 2003) propose a theoretical model supporting an inverted
U-shaped effect of income on weight. They argue that in technologically ad-
vanced countries with low food prices, wealthier individuals who care about
their health will limit their caloric intake, resulting in a negative relation-
ship between income and weight. On the other hand, in technologically less
advanced economies with high food prices, income and weight exhibit a pos-
itive relationship since wealthier individuals can afford to spend more money
on food. Philipson and Posner’s (1999, 2003) argument can be extended to
a within-country setting. Although the level of technology is fixed within
the U.S., the proportion of income spent on food varies across income levels.
Therefore, poor families facing relatively high food prices will exhibit a pos-
itive relationship between income and weight, whereas most families facing
relatively low food prices will exhibit a negative relationship between income
and weight.
To examine whether there is a nonlinear relationship between income and
weight, I estimate the conditional expectation by using Fan’s (1992) locally
weighted regression smoother. This is graphed in Figure 2.1, which demon-
strates that the relationship between family income and childhood obesity is
indeed nonlinear and resembles a mound shape. Furthermore, a closer exam-
ination reveals that nonlinearity occurs because of the children whose family
income is less than the tenth percentile, or approximately $11,000 in year
1999 dollars. Food insecurity is likely to be the driving force behind the pos-
itive association among extremely poor families. Bhattacharya et al. (2004)
show that children aged 2 to 11 from poor families without food insecurity
are more obese than children from poor families with food insecurity. In
other words, children from extremely poor families are less likely to be obese
7If a dummy for obesity status is included as yit, this constitutes a linear probability
(LP) model. A probit or a logit model may seem like a better alternative due to the
limited range of the dependent variables (non-zero or dummy variable). However, I follow
Angrist and Pischke (2008)’s advice that the LP model usually gives similar results as a
nonlinear regression model, while allowing for easier interpretation and implementation.
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than moderately poor families due to lack of food. However, for most of the
children from families without food insecurity, a greater income is associated
with a lower obesity rate.
Aside from the nonlinearity, Figure 2.1 depicts an increasing slope with
respect to children’s age. That is, the obesity rate increases faster for low-
income children. To examine the increasing income gradient, I regress BMI
or obesity status on the logarithm of family income interacted with children’s
grades and other child-specific characteristics. The results are presented in
Table 2.2.8 Each column in the table represents a separate regression. Only
coefficient estimates of family income interacted with grade levels are shown.
Using current family income, columns (1) and (2) display an increase in
the magnitudes of the coefficients with children’s grades.9 In kindergarten, a
doubling of family income is associated with an approximately 1.1 percentage
point decline in the obesity rate, but in first grade, it is associated with a
1.7 percentage point decline. Considering that the average obesity rate is
13% for kindergarten and 14% for first grade, the magnitude of association is
sizable. A closer look at column (2) reveals a considerable increase in the size
of coefficients from first to third and third to fifth grades, where it increases
by 1.2 and 2.2 percentage points, respectively.
As stated in the previous section, family income is recorded in ranges,
except during kindergarten year in the ECLS-K. Because the continuous
income measure provides more refined variations in income, one might prefer
using the continuous kindergarten income measure in place of current income
in other grades. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2 report the results from such
regressions using kindergarten income. Overall, the coefficient estimates are
comparable to those in columns (1) and (2), but the magnitudes are slightly
smaller. Note that using kindergarten income for all grades overlooks the fact
that high socioeconomic status (SES) families’ income increases faster over
time, which explains the smaller coefficients in columns (3) and (4) compared
8Some people may argue that BMI should be restricted to above the normal weight
range, since for those who are underweight, increasing BMI does not necessarily imply an
adverse effect. However, only about 3% of children are underweight in the sample. Thus,
imposing such a restriction is unlikely to change the results. In fact, the results from using
BMI as a dependent variable are largely consistent with those from using obesity status
as a dependent variable.
9To account for nonlinearity, I run the same regressions after dropping the observations
with family income less than the fifth percentile. This results in larger coefficients, but
does not change the main findings.
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to columns (1) and (2). This suggests that using kindergarten income for all
grades is not necessarily the most favorable approach.
A more critical issue related to income measures is that a child’s devel-
opment is more likely to depend on permanent family income rather than
volatile current income, because most families tend to make investments for
their children based on long-term horizons. To address this issue, I consider
two distinct proxies for permanent family income. The first uses the average
of all available family income for each child. This is a widely used proxy
for permanent income, and studies have shown that the greater the number
of years averaged, the better the proxy.10 The second uses a residual from
regressing the log of family income on mother’s age, father’s age, and their
ages squared. This proxy accounts for the differences in family income re-
sulting from the differences in parents’ ages. The results from using these
proxies are reported in columns (5) to (8), where I run the same regressions
as in columns (1) and (2), except that current income is now replaced with
permanent income proxies – the first proxy is used in columns (5) and (6),
while the second proxy is used in columns (7) and (8). Compared to column
(2), the size of the coefficients is significantly larger when a permanent in-
come measure is used in columns (6) and (8). The regression estimates from
using current family income are more likely to suffer from attenuation bias,
since the measurement error from transitory shocks is more severe in current
income measures. Hence, it is not surprising that the coefficient estimates
obtained from using either permanent income proxy are larger in absolute
terms than those obtained from using current income. Since the coefficient
estimates from using either permanent income proxy are very similar, I use
the average income proxy for permanent family income in all subsequent
regressions.
2.3.2 Relationship across the BMI Percentile
So far I have explored the relationship between family income and BMI at
the mean. The birth weight literature suggests that this is unlikely to tell
the entire story. For instance, Abrevaya (2002) documents that the effect
of factors affecting birth weight varies across the infant weight. To better
10See Solon (1992) and Mazumder and Davis (2012).
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understand the relationship, Figure 2.2 plots the BMI distributions for girls
with different income levels at different ages. The distribution for boys looks
similar to that for girls, hence it is omitted.
Categorizing children from families with an income less than the 25th per-
centile as “low-income” and those from families with an income greater than
the 75th percentile as “high-income,” I only plot the youngest (6-year-old)
and the oldest (14-year-old) children for illustrative purposes. In the figure,
a short dashed line represents the CDC’s sex- and age-specific BMI cutoff for
a 6-year-old to be considered “obese,” and a long dashed line indicates the
BMI cutoff for a 14-year-old. If a child’s BMI falls to the right of these dashed
lines, he or she is considered “obese.” At age 6, the low-income children’s BMI
distribution overlaps with the high-income children’s. This results in similar
proportions of obese children from high- and low-income families. By age 14,
however, the distribution of low-income children decompresses further to the
right, with a greater proportion of children falling into the “obese” category.
It is not surprising that the BMI distributions shift to the right, with an
increasing variance, as children age, since everyone’s BMI rises at a different
rate over time. What is noteworthy is how low-income children’s distribution
develops a thicker right tail over time compared to high-income children’s.
This demonstrates that only some low-income children – those who already
had a higher-than-normal BMI – face a higher risk of obesity. Furthermore,
children from high-income families with higher-than-normal BMI are not as
likely as those from low-income families to become obese. In short, family
income seems to play a greater protective role for children who are more
prone to obesity.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate a quantile regression of BMI on the
log of family income and other individual characteristics. Figure 2.3 shows
the quantile regression results, with the income coefficients plotted against
children’s BMI percentiles at different grade levels. For all grade levels, the
income coefficients become more negative as the BMI percentile increases,
which indicates that the strength of the relationship increases with chil-
dren’s BMI. The higher the children’s BMI, the stronger the relationship
between family income and children’s BMI. Therefore, the OLS estimates
from regression (5) in Table 2.2 largely underestimate the strength of the
relationship for children with high BMI, and overestimate for those with low
BMI. During kindergarten, for instance, there is virtually no relationship be-
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tween income and BMI for children below the median BMI, but for children
at the 80th BMI percentile, the quantile coefficient (-0.3) is about 50 per-
cent larger than the OLS estimate (-0.2). Family income may play a greater
protective role for children with high BMI, because high-income parents may
be better equipped to prevent children from further weight gain. They may
have more time and money to effectively manage their children’s weight, or
they could simply be more aware of what a normal weight is considered to
be. In the next section, I explore potential factors that could contribute to
the faster increase in obesity rate among low-income children.
2.4 Results: Understanding the Increasing Income
Gradient
In this section, I explore how an income gradient in obesity develops over
time. Since most children are born within a fairly narrow range of body
weights, some factors that vary with income must contribute to the increasing
difference in obesity rates among children. Previous literature on childhood
obesity focuses on how a specific mechanism, such as a school (Von Hippel et
al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2011), school meal programs (Bhattacharya et al.,
2006; Schanzenbach, 2009; Gundersen et al., 2012) or maternal employment
(Anderson et al., 2003), influences children’s obesity status. Since these
mechanisms are closely tied to family income, I examine how they work
through family income in increasing the obesity gap. In what follows, I
begin by discussing whether a rapid increase in low-income children’s BMI
stems from weight or height, and then proceed to examine the aforementioned
factors.
2.4.1 Weight versus Height
When examining obesity issues, the literature largely ignores the role of
height and only focuses on weight. Since BMI is calculated by dividing
weight by height, low-income children’s BMI can increase faster than high-
income children’s due to their heights not increasing fast enough or their
weights increasing faster. While stunted growth may not be a widespread is-
sue in a developed country like the U.S., low-income children could still grow
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relatively slower than their higher income counterparts. Several studies doc-
ument the positive relationship between a family’s SES and children’s height
(Case and Paxson, 2008; Thomas, 1994; Thomas et al., 1991; Finch and
Beck, 2011), so one cannot overlook the potential role of height in increasing
the obesity gap.
Distinguishing between height and weight factors is also important since
it can provide insights into the underlying mechanisms. One’s weight is
determined by calorie consumption, calorie expansion, and genetics (basal
metabolism), while one’s height is determined by genetics and environmen-
tal factors, such as uterine environment, postnatal diseases, and nutritional
intake. Therefore, if an increasing gradient is due in large part to difference
in rate of weight gain, the focus should be on genetics and net calorie intake.
But if it is due to a different rate of height growth, closer attention must be
paid to malnourishment or the disease environment of low-income children.
To determine which factor has a greater contribution to increasing BMI
and thus the obesity rate, I implement the following regressions.
log(BMIit) = γ0 + γ1 log(Iit) + γ2Xit + 1 (2.1)
log(heightit) = α0 + α1 log(Iit) + α2Xit + 2 (2.2)
log(weightit) = β0 + β1 log(Iit) + β2Xit + 3 (2.3)
Using the formula for BMI (weight/height2), a comparison of γ1 to −2α1
and β1 presents the relative importance of height versus weight.
Table 2.3 lists γ1, α1, and β1 from the regression (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3)
above. The last two columns of the table contain the percentage that height(−2α1
γ1
)
and weight(β1
γ1
) contribute to the BMI. According to the table, the coefficients
for height(α1) are notably smaller than those for weight(β1) and also fairly
constant over time. On the other hand, the coefficients for weight increase as
children age. In other words, the relationship between income and height is
constant, but the relationship between income and weight strengthens over
time.
The comparison between a relative contribution from height(−2α1
γ1
) and
weight(β1
γ1
) indicates that, although comparable at a young age, the role of
weight becomes more crucial with age. By fifth grade, the entire relationship
between income and BMI can be explained by the relationship between in-
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come and weight. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that children’s height
still plays an important role at certain ages. Height contribution increases
from 0% in fifth grade to 12.8% in eighth grade, possibly due to a difference
in the timing of growth spurts between low- and high-income children, as
mentioned previously.
In summary, although both height and weight contribute to the steep-
ening of the income gradient, low-income children’s faster weight gain is a
larger contributor than their slower height growth. This is consistent with
Murasko’s (2013) finding that children’s height does not vary greatly along
the income line. On the other hand, since the birth weight literature illus-
trates that low SES children are more likely to be born with low birth weight,
it is intriguing that once they are born, their rate of weight gain surpasses
high-income children’s.
2.4.2 School Characteristics
The baseline regression model (1) of Table 2.4 presents the results from re-
gressing various measures of weight on the log of permanent family income,
grade level, log income interacted with grade level, and other demographic
variables not shown on the table. Each panel displays the coefficient es-
timates using three different dependent variables: obesity status, BMI, or
normalized BMI.11 The negative coefficient on log income demonstrates a
negative relationship between family income and obesity, whereas the neg-
ative coefficient on log income interacted with grade implies an increasing
strength of the relationship with children’s grades. For instance, column (1)
of Panel A shows that a doubling of income is associated with an approx-
imately 2.7 percentage point decrease in the obesity rate in kindergarten,
but about a 7.5 percentage point decrease in eighth grade. Since the average
obesity rate is 13% in kindergarten and 18% in eighth grade, the size of these
coefficients is considerably large. The other panels confirm these findings. In
subsequent analyses, additional variables hypothesized to impact childhood
obesity are consecutively included in the model. If the inclusion of variables
significantly reduces the income-grade interaction coefficient, that factor is
considered to play an important role in explaining the increasing gradient.
11To make the interpretation easier, I created a normalized BMI measure (ZBMI) with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, based on the sex- and age-specific standard.
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In columns (2) and (3), the school lunch variable and its interaction with
other control variables (grade and income) are included in the model. Column
(4) further includes school fixed effects to examine whether variation in school
quality can explain the increasing gap. Although children eating a school-
provided lunch are likely to differ from those who do not, no econometric
strategy is employed to deal with the selection bias, since the main coefficient
of interest here is income-grade interaction, not the school lunch variable.12
With school fixed effects in column (4), the coefficient estimates on log
income become small and less significant in all panels. In other words, the
relationship between family income and obesity is weak within a specific
school. However, the interaction coefficient remains strong; thus, while the
relationship between income and obesity may be weak within schools, it still
strengthens over time. The inclusion of school lunch interaction variables
along with a school lunch indicator reduces the interaction coefficient slightly.
Column (3) of Panels B and C indicates that the relationship strengthens by
approximately 0.123 BMI points or 1.4% of a standard deviation per grade,
which is not statistically different from the results reported in column (1). In
short, school lunch accounts for little, if any, of the disproportionate weight
gain experienced by low-income children.
2.4.3 Parental Employment Status and Behavior
Table 2.5 is in the same format as Table 2.4, where the first column is simply
a reprint of Table 2.4, column (1). To investigate whether differences in
parental employment status explain the increasing gradient, columns (2) to
(4) include several controls, such as full or part-time employment status and
parental absence from households. The reference group in these regressions
is parents who stay at home because they are either unemployed or not in the
labor force. Columns (2) and (3) examine the role of maternal and paternal
employment separately, while column (4) includes both parents’ employment
status. The inclusion of parental employment status does not change the
income-grade interaction coefficients.
Column (5) investigates whether differences in parental behavior can ex-
plain why low-income children gain weight faster. Parental behavior vari-
12For more detailed discussions on the selection bias issues related to measuring school
lunch effects, see Schanzenbach (2009), Gundersen et al. (2012), and Millimet et al. (2010).
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ables considered here include rules concerning TV watching, frequency of
routine doctor visits, and family meal routines. Overall, the inclusion of
parental behavior variables results in slightly smaller income coefficients. For
instance, Panel B shows that the income coefficient decreases from -0.205 to
-0.139. Hence, part of the income and weight relationship can be explained
by parental behaviors. On the other hand, the increasing gradient persists
even with the additional control variables. Therefore, the increasing gradient
is robust to parental behaviors, although we cannot rule out the possibility
that the variables available for parental behaviors might be poor proxies.
Lastly, columns (6) and (7) include all of the aforementioned factors. Col-
umn (6) includes parental employment status and behaviors, while column
(7) includes the school lunch variable in addition to all of the parental vari-
ables. The inclusion of all parental characteristics does not alter the income-
grade coefficients. The inclusion of both school lunch and parental vari-
ables results in a small but statistically insignificant reduction of the income-
gradient coefficients. For instance, column (7) indicates that the relationship
between income and BMI strengthens by 0.127 points, or 1.4% of a standard
deviation per grade.
2.4.4 Child Specific Characteristics
In this section, I use the panel nature of the dataset to test the role of unob-
served individual heterogeneity. Table 2.6 displays the coefficient estimates
from both the baseline and the child fixed effect regressions. The coefficient
estimates for income are dropped in the fixed effect models, because fixed
effects contain time-invariant factors, including permanent income. Columns
(2), (5), and (8) only include child fixed effects, while columns (3), (6),
and (9) include all of the aforementioned controls – school lunch partici-
pation, parental employment, and parental behaviors – in addition to the
fixed effects. The fixed effect models produce slightly smaller income-grade
coefficients, but the size of the decrease is not statistically significant.
Lastly, to examine heterogeneity in the income gradients, I present the
income-grade interaction coefficients by race and gender in Table 2.7. The
normalized BMI regressions demonstrate that white males, white females,
and black females have large interaction coefficients, while the coefficients for
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black males and both genders of Hispanics are smaller in size. The estimated
coefficients using obesity status as a dependent variable largely reaffirm these
findings, albeit they are statistically insignificant due to small sample sizes.
In short, all groups exhibit the increasing income gradients except Hispanics,
for which the coefficients are small and imprecisely estimated.
2.5 Discussion
Although childhood obesity has increased overall, different obesity rates
across family income suggest that the problem is more serious among partic-
ular groups of children. Moreover, the increasing gradient demonstrates that
this difference across income groups emerges and strengthens as children age.
To understand why low-income children’s weight increases faster over time
compared to higher-income children, I investigate several factors that have
previously been proposed to affect childhood obesity.
First, the role of school characteristics is examined. Since children spend
a large portion of their time at school, school characteristics can poten-
tially have a crucial influence on children’s body weight. One way in which
school might influence weight gain is through school meals.13 School-provided
lunches might account for faster weight gain among low-income children be-
cause the calorie content of school meals could be higher than that of home-
made lunches, and a greater proportion of low-income children eat school-
provided lunches.14 On the other hand, it could simply be that an equal
proportion of low- and high-income children consume school meals, but the
calorie content of school meals consumed by low-income children is higher
than that consumed by high-income children. When an indicator variable for
eating school lunch is included along with its interactions, the income-grade
interaction coefficient decreases slightly, but the decrease is not statistically
significant. Therefore, school-provided meals account for little, if any, of the
13Over 100,000 schools provide lunches through the National School Lunch Program
(NSLP), which is one of the largest child nutrition programs providing lunches to over 30
million students. Any child can buy a full-priced lunch at the NSLP participating schools,
but one must meet the income requirement to be eligible for a reduced price lunch (ERS,
2012). See http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/ for more details.
14Concerned with the high caloric content of school lunches, policymakers recently
passed legislation (the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010) limiting the caloric contents
of school lunches.
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increasing gradient.
Next, I examine whether differences in parental characteristics can account
for the increasing gradient. From their direct investment in children to their
daily habits, parents have an enormous amount of influence on children’s
physical and emotional well-being.15 A single parent may find it more chal-
lenging to prepare a nutritious meal or engage in physical activities with
children. Moreover, children growing up in a single-parent household might
experience increased levels of stress due to instability, leading to higher obe-
sity rates. Even within two-parent households, whether one parent or both
parents work can affect the amount of time and attention given to each child.
Several studies document an adverse effect of parental employment on chil-
dren’s body weight (Anderson et al., 2003; Ruhm, 2008; Liu et al., 2009;
Anderson, 2012). Therefore, low-income children could be gaining weight
faster than higher income children because they are more likely to live with
a single parent or parents who both work. The findings, however, show that
the increasing gradient is robust to parental employment status; thus, an
alternative dimension of parental characteristics is tested. Existing studies
claim that high-income parents are more likely to have rules for bedtime,
make children wear seat belts, and have meals together more frequently and
at regular times (Case and Paxson, 2002; Fiese et al., 2012). These behav-
iors can be a proxy for the extent to which parents invest in their children’s
future and thus work as indicators for other parental behaviors that directly
affect children’s weight. For instance, if some parents frequently take their
children to the dentist for a routine checkup, they might also be more likely
to encourage their children to eat healthily and exercise frequently. Never-
theless, the inclusion of parental behavior variables, even with the parental
employment status, does not change the income gradient coefficients. Only
when the school lunch variable is included along with the parental variables
does the main coefficient decrease slightly.
Since neither school nor parental characteristics can fully account for the
faster weight gain by low-income children, I investigate whether some un-
observable differences among children could potentially be accountable. As-
suming that genetic makeup is fixed over time, low-income children could
be gaining weight faster because of a genetic propensity inherited from their
15Please see Carlson and Corcoran (2001) and Manski et al. (2002).
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parents, and parents could be earning less because of their heavier weight.16
This would result in a negative association between parental income and
childhood obesity that also strengthens over time. Nevertheless, the fixed
effect model results in only a small reduction of the income gradient coeffi-
cient.
Given that children’s permanent heterogeneity does not account for the
increasing gradient, we can consider two arguments. The first is that there
may be other mechanisms that vary over time and thus cannot be controlled
for by including child fixed effects. Herbst and Tekin (2011) consider child-
care subsidies, while Gundersen et al. (2011) propose psychosocial stressors
as potential factors affecting childhood obesity. If low-income children are
protected from weight gain only during their younger years by non-monetary
welfare programs – such as Women, Infants and Children – or if they face
an increasing level of psychosocial stress as they get older, this could lead
to an increasing gradient that cannot be accounted for by the inclusion of
fixed effects. The second argument is that, assuming their metabolic rates
change little over time, low-income children are gaining more weight because
of their high net calorie intake. To examine this hypothesis, I compare the
food intakes and physical activity levels across children from different in-
come levels, using the children’s self-reported information in fifth and eighth
grades.17 The result indicates that a smaller percentage of the high-income
children frequently consume sweets and fast food, and a larger percentage
of them also exercise frequently compared to the low-income children in the
sample. Since the result is far from conclusive due to the limited nature of
information available in the ECLS-K, future studies could employ alternative
data sources for a more concrete analysis.18
Section 4.1 implies that children entering puberty may experience differ-
ent rates of height growth depending on their family income levels. This
suggests that a growth spurt during puberty may change the relationship
between income and obesity for post-pubescent adolescents. While it would
be interesting to test such a hypothesis, a comparison of the income-obesity
16See Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), Averett and Korenman (1996), Cawley (2004),
and Wada and Tekin (2010).
17The table is available upon request.
18Diet information in the ECLS-K consists of children’s answers to how many times he
or she bought a specific type of food in school, without any information on the actual
amount bought, consumed, or consumed outside of school.
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relationship between pre- and post-puberty is not feasible given the current
dataset. The ECLS-K follows children only up to eighth grade, where chil-
dren’s age ranges from 12 to 15. Since a growth spurt begins on average
at age 11 for boys and 9 for girls, and lasts for approximately 5 to 6 years,
very few children in the sample would have reached the post-puberty stage.
Additionally, children who enter and exit a growth spurt earlier than oth-
ers are unlikely to be a representative sample.19 On the other hand, Baum
and Ruhm (2009) illustrate an increasing socioeconomic gradient in weight
for individuals over 18; therefore, it is likely that the trend of an increasing
obesity gap will continue even after puberty.
One caveat of this paper is the potential endogeneity issue. Although focus-
ing on children instead of adults circumvents the reverse causality problem,
and the fixed effect approach controls for time-invariant unobservables, they
do not control for time-variant unobservables correlated with income. For in-
stance, if low-income children’s environment changes over time in a way that
adversely affects their weights, then a strengthening of the income-weight
relationship would be spurious. Addressing such time-variant unobservables
requires a valid instrument, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Never-
theless, the paper provides groundwork for future research by proposing an
alternative approach to the obesity issue and by suggesting potential mech-
anisms.
2.6 Conclusion
Despite the overall trend of increasing childhood obesity in the U.S., not
all children face the same risk. However, thus far the literature has focused
largely on how to mitigate overall childhood obesity. While understanding
what impacts overall childhood obesity is crucial, it is also important to
understand why some children are more vulnerable to becoming obese than
others.
In this paper, I demonstrate that children from low-income families are
more prone to becoming obese than those from high-income families. All
19Abbassi (1998) notes that pubertal growth is largely sex and race dependent. Girls
and blacks are more likely to enter and exit a pubertal growth spurt earlier than boys and
whites.
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children start out with similar weights in kindergarten, but by eighth grade,
children from low-income families are more likely to be obese than those from
high-income families. The calorie content of school-provided meals accounts
for some but not all of the increasing gradient. Differences in net calorie
intake support the hypothesis that low-income children might be gaining
more weight over time due to a higher net calorie intake, but no one specific
mechanism is identified.
Future research efforts can be directed toward identifying the mechanisms
behind the increasing gradient, since it could lead to an effective reduction in
the obesity rate and perhaps even erode a pathway through which intergen-
erational wealth is transmitted. Only a few factors – school meal programs,
parental employment, parental behaviors, and individual characteristics –
have been examined in this paper. Thus, future studies can focus on alter-
native mechanisms not explored here.
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Figure 2.1: The relationship between family income and childhood obesity
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Notes: The first two dashed lines from the left indicate the fifth and the tenth income percentile. The
rest of the dashed lines indicate the 25th, 50th, and 75th income percentiles. The graph plots the
conditional expectation calculated using Fan’s (1992) locally weighted regression smoother. The above
graph demonstrates that the relationship between family income and childhood obesity is (1) overall
negative (2) nonlinear and (3) becomes stronger as children age.
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Figure 2.2: BMI distribution by age and family income
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Notes: In this figure, “low-income” is defined as children from families with an income less than the 25th
percentile, and “high-income” is defined as those from families with an income greater than the 75th
percentile. The short dashed line indicates the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) provided sex- and
age-specific BMI cutoff for 6-year-old children to be categorized as “obese.” The long dashed line
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Figure 2.3: Quantile regression
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Notes: The figure shows the relationship between family income and BMI. The plots include quantile
regression and ordinary least squares estimates, with 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
K 1st 3rd 5th 8th
Panel A. Dependent variables
BMI (kg/m2) 16.45 16.89 18.61 20.47 22.73
Height (inches) 45.93 48.40 53.05 57.61 64.44
Weight (pounds) 49.65 56.71 75.22 97.70 134.58
Underweight (<5th) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
Overweight (85th≤BMI< 95th) 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.17
Obese (≥95th) 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.18
Panel B. Control variables
Age 5.98 7.15 9.26 11.24 14.22
Family income (year 1999$) 57,260 57,935 59,492 59,236 61,529
Log of family income 10.64 10.68 10.71 10.69 10.76
Poor 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13
Black 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Hispanic 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17
Male 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
Mother’s age 33.9 35.1 38.2 39.9 42.2
Father’s age 36.5 37.6 40.6 42.4 44.7
Household size 4.65 4.69 4.69 4.67 4.57
N 9,287 9,115 8,654 9,146 6,913
Notes: The ECLS-K is longitudinal data. Whether a child is “obese” or not is determined using
the 2000 Centers for Disease Control (CDC) sex- and age-specific growth chart. If a child’s BMI
is greater than the 95th percentile, then he/she is considered “obese.” The family income variable
is obtained by asking parents, “What was the total income of all persons in your household over
the past year, including salaries or other earnings, interest, retirement, and so on for all household
members?” The variable “Poor” is created by comparing respondents’ family income to the Census
poverty threshold, which varies by household size.
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Table 2.3: Relative contribution of height and weight to increasing BMI
log(BMI) log(height) log(weight) % height % weight
γ1 α1 β1
−2α1
γ1
β1
γ1
K -0.014*** 0.001 -0.011** 14.3% 78.6%
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
1st -0.015*** 0.002 -0.011* 26.7% 73.3%
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
3rd -0.029*** 0.001 -0.027*** 6.9% 93.1%
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
5th -0.045*** 0.000 -0.045*** 0.0% 100%
(0.006) (0.002) (0.008)
8th -0.047*** 0.003 -0.042*** 12.8% 89.4%
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions also include school grades, race (black
and hispanic) and gender dummies, as well as household size, mother’s age, father’s age, and their
interactions with grade levels. Only the coefficient estimates of family income interacted with grade
levels are displayed on this table. Note that the coefficients for BMI (column 1) differ from those in
column 5 of Table 2.2, since the dependent variable is in logarithm. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are estimated using the paired jackknife replication method.
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Table 2.4: Relationship between weight and school characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Obesity status
log(income) -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.045*** -0.009*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005)
log(inc) × Grade -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
R2 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.197
Panel B. BMI
log(income) -0.205*** -0.181** -0.464*** 0.029
(0.072) (0.072) (0.132) (0.054)
log(inc) × Grade -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.123*** -0.131***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012)
R2 0.282 0.282 0.283 0.432
Panel C. Normalized BMI (ZBMI)
log(income) -0.101*** -0.092*** -0.142*** -0.027*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.042) (0.015)
log(inc) × Grade -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.206
School lunch x x x
School lunch interaction x x
School fixed effects x
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each column represents a separate regression. The
basic model for each regression is yit = α1Iit + α2Grade+ α3(Iit ×Grade) +Xitβ + it, where
yit is an obesity dummy, BMI, or ZBMI, Iit is the log of permanent family income, and Xit
includes race (black and hispanic) and gender dummies as well as household size, mother’s age,
father’s age, and their interactions with grade levels. The school lunch variable is created using a
question that asks, “Does a child usually receive a complete lunch offered at school? By complete
school lunch, I mean a complete meal such as a salad, soup, a sandwich, or a hot meal that is
offered each day at a fixed price, not just milk, snacks, and ice cream.” In the ECLS-K data,
each child at a different grade level is assigned with a school identification code, which enables
the inclusion of school fixed effects in regression (4). Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are estimated using the paired jackknife replication method.
27
T
ab
le
2.
5:
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
w
ei
gh
t
an
d
fa
m
il
y
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
P
a
n
el
A
.
O
be
si
ty
st
a
tu
s
lo
g
(i
n
co
m
e)
-0
.0
27
**
*
-0
.0
25
**
*
-0
.0
28
**
*
-0
.0
27
**
*
-0
.0
23
**
-0
.0
24
**
*
-0
.0
42
**
*
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
13
)
lo
g
(i
n
c)
×
G
ra
d
e
-0
.0
06
**
*
-0
.0
06
**
*
-0
.0
06
**
*
-0
.0
06
**
*
-0
.0
06
**
*
-0
.0
06
**
*
-0
.0
06
**
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
R
2
0.
02
3
0.
02
5
0.
02
3
0.
02
5
0.
02
6
0.
02
8
0.
02
9
P
a
n
el
B
.
B
M
I
lo
g
(i
n
co
m
e)
-0
.2
05
**
*
-0
.1
97
**
*
-0
.2
13
**
*
-0
.2
19
**
*
-0
.1
39
*
-0
.1
59
**
-0
.3
95
**
*
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.1
38
)
lo
g
(i
n
c)
×
G
ra
d
e
-0
.1
31
**
*
-0
.1
31
**
*
-0
.1
31
**
*
-0
.1
31
**
*
-0
.1
31
**
*
-0
.1
31
**
*
-0
.1
27
**
*
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
21
)
R
2
0.
28
2
0.
28
5
0.
28
2
0.
28
5
0.
28
5
0.
28
7
0.
28
8
P
a
n
el
C
.
N
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
B
M
I
lo
g
(i
n
co
m
e)
-0
.1
01
**
*
-0
.1
03
**
*
-0
.0
94
**
*
-0
.1
00
**
*
-0
.0
77
**
-0
.0
78
**
-0
.1
16
**
*
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
44
)
lo
g
(i
n
c)
×
G
ra
d
e
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
14
**
*
-0
.0
14
**
*
-0
.0
14
**
*
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
14
**
*
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
R
2
0.
03
1
0.
03
5
0.
03
1
0.
03
6
0.
03
6
0.
04
0
0.
04
0
M
o
th
er
’s
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
x
x
x
x
F
a
th
er
’s
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
x
x
x
x
P
ar
en
ta
l
b
eh
av
io
rs
x
x
x
S
ch
o
o
l
lu
n
ch
x
N
o
te
s:
*
p
<
0
.1
0
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
E
a
ch
co
lu
m
n
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
se
p
a
ra
te
re
g
re
ss
io
n
.
T
h
e
b
a
si
c
m
o
d
el
fo
r
ea
ch
re
g
re
ss
io
n
is
y
it
=
α
1
I i
t
+
α
2
G
r
a
d
e
+
α
3
(I
it
×
G
r
a
d
e)
+
X
it
β
+
 i
t
,
w
h
er
e
y
it
is
a
n
o
b
es
it
y
d
u
m
m
y,
B
M
I,
o
r
Z
B
M
I,
I i
t
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
fa
m
il
y
in
co
m
e,
a
n
d
X
it
in
cl
u
d
es
ra
ce
(b
la
ck
a
n
d
h
is
p
a
n
ic
)
a
n
d
g
en
d
er
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
si
ze
,
m
o
th
er
’s
a
g
e,
fa
th
er
’s
a
g
e,
a
n
d
th
ei
r
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
w
it
h
g
ra
d
e
le
v
el
s.
T
h
e
o
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ry
in
th
e
ta
b
le
is
a
p
a
re
n
t
w
h
o
st
a
y
s
a
t
h
o
m
e
ei
th
er
b
ec
a
u
se
h
e/
sh
e
is
u
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
o
r
n
o
t
in
th
e
la
b
o
r
fo
rc
e.
A
ll
p
a
re
n
ta
l
b
eh
a
v
io
r
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
d
er
iv
ed
fr
o
m
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s
a
sk
ed
d
ir
ec
tl
y
to
ch
il
d
re
n
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
.
P
a
re
n
ta
l
b
eh
a
v
io
r
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
in
cl
u
d
e
ru
le
s
a
b
o
u
t
T
V
w
a
tc
h
in
g
,
fr
eq
u
en
cy
o
f
d
o
ct
o
r/
d
en
ti
st
v
is
it
s,
a
n
d
fa
m
il
y
m
ea
l
ro
u
ti
n
es
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
a
n
d
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
p
a
ir
ed
ja
ck
k
n
if
e
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
m
et
h
o
d
.
28
T
ab
le
2.
6:
A
cc
ou
n
ti
n
g
fo
r
ti
m
e
in
va
ri
an
t
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
O
b
e
se
B
M
I
Z
B
M
I
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
lo
g(
in
c)
-0
.0
27
**
*
-0
.2
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
7
2
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
lo
g(
in
c)
-0
.0
06
**
*
-0
.0
05
**
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.1
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.1
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
×G
ra
d
e
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
C
h
il
d
F
E
x
x
x
x
x
x
C
on
tr
ol
s
x
x
x
R
2
0.
02
3
0.
74
4
0
.7
4
7
0
.2
8
2
0
.8
1
2
0
.8
1
3
0
.0
3
1
0
.8
3
2
0
.8
3
6
N
43
11
7
40
69
7
3
9
0
7
9
4
3
1
1
7
4
0
6
9
7
3
9
0
7
9
4
3
0
7
3
4
0
6
3
3
3
9
0
1
8
N
o
te
s:
*
p
<
0
.1
0
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
E
a
ch
co
lu
m
n
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
se
p
a
ra
te
re
g
re
ss
io
n
.
T
h
e
b
a
si
c
m
o
d
el
fo
r
ea
ch
re
g
re
ss
io
n
is
y
it
=
α
1
I i
t
+
α
2
G
r
a
d
e
+
α
3
(I
it
×
G
r
a
d
e)
+
X
it
β
+
 i
t
,
w
h
er
e
y
it
is
a
n
o
b
es
it
y
d
u
m
m
y,
B
M
I
o
r
Z
B
M
I,
I i
t
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
fa
m
il
y
in
co
m
e,
a
n
d
X
it
in
cl
u
d
es
ra
ce
(b
la
ck
a
n
d
h
is
p
a
n
ic
)
a
n
d
g
en
d
er
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
si
ze
,
m
o
th
er
’s
a
g
e,
fa
th
er
’s
a
g
e,
a
n
d
th
ei
r
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
w
it
h
g
ra
d
e
le
v
el
s.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(2
),
(3
),
(5
),
(6
),
(8
),
a
n
d
(9
)
in
cl
u
d
e
ch
il
d
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
,
h
en
ce
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
lo
g
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
in
co
m
e
a
re
m
is
si
n
g
.
29
Table 2.7: Increasing income gradient by gender and race
Obese ZBMI
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
Panel A. Male
log(inc)×Grade -0.007* -0.006 -0.004 -0.021** -0.009 0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.016) (0.013)
R2 0.026 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.027 0.014
N 15943 1996 4021 15926 1994 4016
Panel B. Female
log(inc)×Grade -0.005* -0.016 -0.003 -0.019** -0.022 -0.004
(0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.009) (0.019) (0.011)
R2 0.015 0.050 0.013 0.021 0.034 0.015
N 15340 1948 3869 15325 1945 3867
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table contains 12 separate regressions. The basic model
for each regression is yit = α1Iit +α2Grade+α3(Iit ×Grade) +Xitβ + it, where yit is either an obesity
dummy or ZBMI, Iit is the log of permanent family income, and Xit includes race (black and hispanic)
and gender dummies as well as household size, mother’s age, father’s age, and their interactions with grade
levels. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are estimated using the paired jackknife replication
method.
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CHAPTER 3
DOES THE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT INCREASE CHILDREN’S
WEIGHT? THE IMPACT OF
POLICY-DRIVEN INCOME ON
CHILDHOOD OBESITY
3.1 Introduction
In 2012, approximately one out of five children aged six to eleven were obese
in the US (Ogden et al., 2014). What is particularly intriguing about such
high obesity rates is that not all children face the same risk. Children from
low-income families are much more likely to be obese than children from
high-income families (Anderson and Butcher, 2006; Kumanyika and Grier,
2006; Strauss and Pollack, 2001). Then, could family income play a role in
protecting children from obesity?
This paper investigates what effect a family income has on childhood obe-
sity. I exploit large income shocks generated by changes to the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC) program in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the income
changes driven by the EITC expansion were exogenous to children’s weight,
they provide an opportunity to study the causal effect of income. Using
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), I find that a
policy-driven increase in income increases the weight of children among the
EITC-eligible families. The finding suggests that a non-health program such
as the EITC could have an unintended negative consequence.
The expansion of the EITC program affects children’s weight through mul-
tiple channels, however, I isolate only the effect of income generated by policy
changes. The expansion induced a maternal employment response in addition
to generating exogenous income shocks. A change in income originating from
a maternal employment change is endogenous since it cannot be separated
from an effect of changing maternal time spent with children. Therefore, in
order to identify a causal income effect, I estimate only the effect of income
generated by policy changes and not by maternal employment changes. Iso-
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lating only the effect of policy-driven income also sheds light on potential
outcome if benefit amounts of other cash transfer program were to be raised.
My empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. I start with an ordinary
least squares (OLS) model to understand the general relationship between
different types of income and childhood obesity. Next, to account for the
omitted variable bias in OLS estimates, I employ a difference-in-difference
(DD) strategy that exploits a larger income shock to families with two or
more children compared with families with one child after the largest EITC
expansion (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 or OBRA 93). The
DD estimates likely contain the effect of maternal employment in addition to
the effect of policy-driven income. Therefore, I employ the first-differenced
instrumental variable (IV) strategy using the change in the EITC amount
as an instrument for the change in family income to isolate only the policy-
driven income effect. Since the EITC income is determined by family income
itself, the instrument using current income violates the exogeneity condi-
tion of the instrument. Hence, I calculate the EITC income using current
income predicted by lagged income, thereby removing any income changes
originating from a maternal employment change.
Because of four critical features, I use the NLSY79 and its Child/Young
Adult supplement. First, the panel nature of the data set enables removal of
any individual differences among children that are fixed over time. Second,
I can match children to their mothers. Extensive information on a child’s
development can be linked to the mother’s current and historical character-
istics. Third, the data set contains a detailed information on family income,
demographic characteristics, and residence enables me to simulate the EITC
amount for which each family is eligible.1 Finally, children’s height and
weight are directly measured by interviewers in most observations; hence,
they are more accurate than self-reported measures commonly available in
other health data sets.
Both OLS and DD estimates imply an adverse effect of income on child-
hood obesity. The OLS estimates show a positive relationship between the
EITC income and childhood obesity. However, the relationship is likely to
1Many states provide additional credits to families eligible for the federal EITC.
The payout amount varies by state but is generally a specific percentage of the fed-
eral EITC amount. For more information on the state EITC rates, see NBER webpage
(http://users.nber.org/∼taxsim/state-eitc.html). See Hotz and Scholz (2003) for addi-
tional information on the EITC program in general.
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be spurious. The DD estimates suggest that children from families who ex-
perienced a larger income shock gained more weight after the OBRA 93. In
particular, children from families with two or more children (the treatment
group) experienced a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of obesity
compared with children from families with one child (the control group).
The IV estimates reaffirm the finding from the OLS and DD estimates.
The estimates show that a particular type of income shock – such as the one
induced by an expansion of the EITC program – leads to children’s weight
gain. In particular, a $1,000 increase in policy-driven income leads to an
increase in body mass index (BMI) by 0.02% of a standard deviation or a
0.5 percentage point increase in obesity rates. The finding is robust across
specifications that account for possible confounding factors and use various
functional forms of an instrument.
I propose potential explanations for why a policy-driven increase in income
leads to children’s weight gain. Since only low-income families are affected
by the EITC expansions, the mechanism behind the children’s weight gain
must be related to unique characteristics of the EITC income and low-income
families. The lump sum and temporary nature of the EITC income likely
increases a family’s food expenditure and encourages a volatile food con-
sumption pattern leading to weight gain (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009;
Townsend et al, 2001). On the other hand, the finding also demonstrates
that children’s net caloric intake increases when families receive additional
income. Such an increase in caloric intake could be driven by low-income
parents’ lack of nutrition knowledge, limited access to quality child care, a
budget constraint, or preference for high-caloric food.
The main finding offers an important lesson that a non-health program
could unintentionally affect health outcomes of the recipients. Although a
large body of literature demonstrates that an expansion of the EITC pro-
gram succeeded in incentivizing unemployed low-income mothers to enter the
workforce, my findings suggest that it also had an adverse impact on at least
some children.2 Therefore, it is critical to consider all possible avenues of the
program’s effect to understand the full consequences of a public policy.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it adds to the
current body of knowledge on the role of family income in child development
2See Eissa and Hoynes (2004), Eissa and Liebman (1996), Ellwood (2000), Meyer
(2002), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001).
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by examining the income effect on children’s body weight, one specific, yet
crucial aspect of child development (Case et al., 2002; Dahl and Lochner,
2012). Given that a number of social safety net programs transfer income in
the hopes of improving family’s well-being, it is important to understand the
impact income has on children’s weight. Second, although studies investi-
gating the causal effect of income on adolescent weight (Akee et al., 2013) or
adult weight (Schmeiser, 2009) exist, no study has yet examined the causal
effect on children’s weight. Because obese children tend to become obese
adults (Krebs and Jacobson, 2003), in order to prevent obesity and other
related illnesses among adults, it is important to understand what makes
children obese. Furthermore, this is the first paper to study the effect of a
non-health program on childhood obesity to the best of my knowledge. A
growing number of studies examine how a non-health program – such as the
EITC or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) – affects health
outcomes (Almond et al., 2011; Averett and Wang, 2013; Currie and Cole,
1993; Hoynes et al., 2012; Kehrer and Wolin, 1979). The paper adds to the
literature by providing new evidence on the effect of the EITC expansion on
childhood obesity.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the EITC expansions
and discusses its effect on child obesity. Section 3 presents the empirical
framework. The data set is described in Section 4. Section 5 reports the
results, and Section 6 discusses implications of the main finding. Section 7
concludes.
3.2 Expansion of the EITC Program
3.2.1 The EITC Expansion as an Exogenous Variation in
Income
The EITC program experienced several significant expansions in the late
1980s and 1990s. The first increase in benefit amount occurred after the pas-
sage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86). The Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 90) initiated a separation in credit amount for
taxpayers with two or more children from taxpayers with one child although
the difference was modest (see figure 3.1). The EITC benefit rose once again
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with the OBRA 93, which provided an especially large increase in benefits
for families with two or more children.
The expansion of the EITC program generated an exogenous variation in
family income. Policymakers’ desire to move people out of social safety net
programs and into the workforce motivated legislative actions – such as the
TRA 86, OBRA 90, OBRA 93 – that led to the EITC expansions. As a
result, the amount of EITC benefits grew dramatically for all eligible fam-
ilies (Figure 3.2). For instance, the maximum benefit amount that families
with two or more children received more than quadrupled to $3,771 in 2001
from $852 (in year 2000 dollars) in 1985. The EITC expansion provided an
exogenous income variation since the underlying motivation of the expansion
was irrelevant to factors affecting children’s weight.
Among the three expansions, the OBRA 93 provides an identifying varia-
tion for the DD strategy. The OBRA 93 generated a large benefit increase
for families with two or more children compared with families with one child.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the maximum benefit amount for families with
two or more children increased by $2,034 (2000 dollars) compared with only
$632 for families with one child. Since the EITC-eligible families could not
have predetermined the number of child births with an expectation of the
legislative action, the differing size of an income shock the OBRA 93 gener-
ated serves well as a natural experiment. A number of studies take the same
approach to examine the effect of the EITC expansion on various outcomes
(Averett and Wang, 2013; Evans and Garthwaite, 2010; Hoynes et al., 2012).
The TRA 86 and the OBRA 90 provide additional exogenous variations
in income for the IV strategy. Although the size of the increase in benefit
amount was not as substantial as that generated by the OBRA 93, both
legislative actions still provided exogenous income variations. I construct
an instrument that consists of a change in the EITC amount that families
experienced because of the expansions. I leave the detailed discussion of
constructing a valid instrument for the next section.
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3.2.2 The Effect of the EITC Expansions on Children’s
Weight
The EITC expansions affect children’s weight through three channels. The
first channel is by directly increasing the amount of the EITC benefits. Even
if a family’s earned income does not change, the family’s total after-tax in-
come increases over time because of several program expansions. Second,
some families may also experience additional income gain because of an in-
crease in maternal employment. The empirical evidence suggests that the
expansions prompt a maternal labor supply response, which leads to higher
earned income among some families (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Eissa and
Liebman, 1996; Ellwood, 2000; Meyer, 2002; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001).3
Finally, an increase in maternal labor supply reduces the amount of time
mothers spend with children. The reduction in maternal time with children
likely has an adverse impact on children’s weight. As mothers enter work-
force, their time preparing home cooked meals and taking children out for
physical activities decline, adversely affecting children’s weight (Anderson et
al, 2003; Liu et al, 2009; Ruhm, 2008; Ziol-Guest et al, 2012). Children
from low-income families are especially vulnerable to such weight gain since
alternative options to maternal care is worse than for children from higher
income families.
The effect of income on children’s weight, however, is ambiguous. For
instance, additional financial resources can lead to a reduction in children’s
weight by allowing income constrained families to buy healthier food (Inglis
et al., 2009) and by reducing children’s stress levels (Gundersen et al., 2011).
On the other hand, additional income can increase the frequency of restaurant
meals consumed (Lee and Brown, 1986) and induce more sedentary behaviors
leading to an opposite outcome.
In this paper, I attempt to isolate only the effect of the first channel.
Since a number of social safety net programs transfer cash with the hopes of
improving low-income families’ overall well-being, it is important to ask what
happens to a child health when such benefit amount increases. Furthermore,
studying how policy-driven income affects childhood obesity can shed light
on potential ways to curb obesity and reveal the full consequences of similar
3The EITC expansion leads to an increase in labor supply by single mothers and a
decrease in labor supply by married mothers.
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income transfer programs.
3.3 Empirical Framework
The empirical strategies utilize policy induced variations in income to esti-
mate the effect of income on children’s weight. The OLS estimate contains
the effect of all three channels and is likely to be biased; hence, I employ
the DD strategy to alleviate the potential endogeneity issue. Since I cannot
disentangle the three channels from DD estimates, I use the first-differenced
IV strategy to isolate only the policy-driven effect of income.
3.3.1 Modeling Children’s Weight Gain
The weight of a child is determined by a number of observable and unobserv-
able factors. The basic model for estimating the impact of family income on
children’s weight is,
yit = Iitα +X
′
itβ + w
′
iγ + µi + it (3.1)
where yit is a measure of child i’s body weight at time t, Iit is a total family
income net of taxes and including the EITC amount for the previous calendar
year, and Xit denotes a vector of time-variant characteristics, such as number
of siblings, a parent’s age, and a mother’s marital status (see Table 3.1).4 wi
is a vector of observable time-invariant characteristics, such as a child’s race
and gender, and µi is unobservable time-invariant characteristics.
Implicit in equation (1) is that the income effect estimated here refers to
changes in outcome brought on by a transitory income shock rather than a
permanent income shock. Empirical evidence illustrates that a permanent
income is more strongly correlated with child outcomes than a transitory
income since parents make investment in children looking at a long-term
horizon (Case et al., 2002). However, the causal effect of permanent income
4To construct Iit, the federal and state tax liabilities are subtracted from, and the
non-taxable income and the simulated EITC amount are added to the TAXSIM generated
adjusted gross income (AGI).
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is challenging to estimate because of the difficulty of finding a valid exoge-
nous variation in permanent income. Therefore, I only estimate the effect of
current income in this paper.
The OLS model in equation (3.1) potentially suffers from an endogeneity
issue. Since children from low-income families are exposed more to envi-
ronments that adversely affect their weight, causality of income cannot be
inferred from equation (3.1). For instance, if a school lunch causes weight
gain, and a greater proportion of low-income children eat school lunch, then
family income and children’s weight would exhibit a negative relationship.
However, family income does not directly increase children’s weight in this
case; thus, a change in family income without a change in school lunch par-
ticipation will not generate any weight change.
In order to remove a potential source of endogeneity, I estimate the modi-
fied first-differenced model as follows:
∆yit = ∆Iitα + ∆X
′
itβ + w
′
iγ + ∆it, (3.2)
where γ = γt−γt−1. The specification allows the changes in children’s weight
to vary by observable permanent characteristics. In the model (3.2), µi is
eliminated, thereby removing the bias that could result from its correlation
with Iit.
Although using the first-differenced model removes any time-invariant dif-
ferences among children, it is not necessarily better than the OLS model.
A family income measure contains measurement error because it is self-
reported. The attenuation bias from measurement error is worse in the
differenced estimates than in the OLS estimates. Moreover, even without
an attenuation bias, the differenced estimates could still be biased because of
a potential correlation between a change in income (∆Iit) and a change in an
unobservable shock affecting children’s weight (∆it). For instance, a shock
to parental health could affect both family income and children’s weight.
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3.3.2 Using the EITC Expansion to Estimate the Income
Effect
Difference-in-Difference Model
In order to estimate a causal effect of income, I employ a DD strategy. Taking
advantage of the large separation in benefit amount based on the number of
dependent children, I estimate the following reduced-form model.
yit = θ ∗ (Two plus children) + λ(Two plus children) ∗ (after treatment)(3.3)
+δt +X
′
itρ+ µi + ξit
where Two plus children is a dummy variable for families with two or more
children, δt reflects year dummies, and Xit is the same vector of controls as
in equation (3.1).5 Following Eissa and Hoyne’s (2004) specification, I use
1985–1993 as the pre-treatment periods and 1994–2001 as the post-treatment
periods. In some specifications, I also include child fixed effects, µi. The
parameter of interest is λ.
The preferred model controls for both time trend and group characteristics.
The DD estimate relies on the assumption that, in the absence of a treatment,
the trend for body weight is constant across children from families with two
or more children (treatment group) and children from families with one child
(control group). The preferred model includes time trend as well as group
characteristics, thus, relaxing the assumption that a composition of treatment
and control groups does not change over time.
Instrumental Variable Model
I use the IV strategy to identify only the policy-driven income effect, which is
challenging in the DD or the first-differenced framework. The first-differenced
estimate is likely to be biased because of endogeneity. The DD estimate
likely contains effects besides the income effect. Therefore, I use the first-
differenced IV strategy to resolve issues arising from DD and the first-differenced
5I use a linear probability model instead of a probit model since both models give
similar results but estimates from the former are easier to interpret (Angrist and Pischke,
2008).
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strategy.
Because the EITC amount is determined by the endogenous variable itself,
constructing a valid instrument is not a trivial task. In order for an instru-
ment to be valid for equation (3.2), it must be correlated with a change in
family income (∆Iit) but not correlated with a change in other unobserv-
ables affecting children’s weight (∆it). Since family income contains the
EITC amount, the first condition is easily satisfied by using a change in the
EITC amount as an instrument. For instance, an instrument in the following
form:
∆zIVi (Pi,t, Pi,t−1) = zi,t(Pi,t)− zi,t−1(Pi,t−1) (3.4)
= (EITCt based on inct)− (EITCt−1 based on inct−1)
with zi,t as the EITC amount and Pi,t as pretax income, satisfies the first con-
dition. However, such an instrument violates the exogeneity condition. The
EITC amount for those who qualify is determined by their earned income;
thus, any endogenous income change leads to a change in the EITC amount
that is correlated with unobservable factors affecting children’s weight. For
instance, if parents become ill and family income decreases as a result, this,
in turn, will generate a change in the EITC amount (∆zIVi ) that is correlated
with a change in parental behaviors (∆it).
An ideal instrument, then, consists only of the EITC change generated
by a structural change and other exogenous income shocks. An exogenous
income shock originates from fluctuations in inflation rates or business cycles
whereas an endogenous income shock occurs because of a factor affecting
both family income and children’s weight, such as a parental health shock.
The amount of the EITC a family receives could change over time because
of (1) a structural change to the program, (2) an endogenous income shock,
or (3) an exogenous income shock. Only (1) and (3) are part of a valid
instrument.
One way to remove an endogenous income shock is to use predicted income
instead of current income when calculating the current EITC amount. By
assuming that income evolves in a predictable manner over two periods, only
the EITC change generated by a structural program change is included as
an instrument. In practice, a current income is predicted with an indicator
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for a positive lagged income and a fifth-order polynomial in lagged income.6
In what follows, I present three distinct forms of a valid instrument. If
estimates are consistent across the models using different instruments the
result is more strongly corroborated. The simplest way to construct a valid
instrument is by assigning the maximum EITC benefit that each family is
eligible for based only on the number of children and tax year. This is also
the form of an instrument that Schmeiser (2009) uses. The first instrument
is,
∆zIV 1i = Maximum zi,t(Eˆ[Pi,t|Pi,t−1])−Maximum zi,t−1(Pi,t−1)
= [Maximum EITCt based on predicted inc]
−[Maximum EITCt−1 based on inct−1]
(3.5)
where zi,t(Eˆ[Pi,t|Pi,t−1]) is an EITC amount calculated using a predicted in-
come instead of current income.
The ∆zIV 1i satisfies the exogeneity condition of a valid instrument but is
weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. Since the instrument strictly
consists of a change in the maximum benefit amount due to a structural
program change, it is not correlated with an unobservable shock. On the
other hand, the instrument is a crude measure. The method assigns the same
treatment to all families regardless of their income levels, when in reality the
change in EITC amount each family receives varies based on their income.
For instance, only about 13% of eligible families receive the maximum benefit
amount in the current sample (Table 3.9).
To improve upon the crudeness of a measure, an alternative form of an
instrument can be constructed by first dividing families into multiple income
groups and assigning a different level of treatment to each group afterwards.
In practice, families are categorized into four income groups with equal ranges
that do not vary over time. The benefit amount corresponding to the mid-
point income level of each group is calculated thereafter for different numbers
of children. Depending on the group each family belongs to and the number
of children, the benefit amount is assigned accordingly. This way, a family
6By imposing such a functional form, the instrument implicitly assumes that income
evolves in an expected way, and, thus, lagged income gives a good prediction of the current
income. An alternative functional form is to set Eˆ[Pi,t|Pi,t−1] = Pi,t−1, thereby holding
family income constant for two consecutive years.
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is assigned with one of the eight benefit amounts every year. The strategy
yields the following form of an instrument:
∆zIV 2i = zi,t(Group(Eˆ[Pi,t|Pi,t−1]))− zi,t−1(Group(Pi,t−1))
= [EITCt based on middle inc of group]
−[EITCt−1 based on middle inc of group]
(3.6)
Although ∆zIV 2i refines the treatment compared to the first instrument,
it is still somewhat of a crude measure since families are assigned with only
one of eight treatment amounts.
The third instrument follows the form proposed by Dahl and Lochner
(2012).
∆zIV 3i = zi,t(Eˆ[Pi,t|Pi,t−1])− zi,t−1(Pi,t−1) (3.7)
= [EITCt based on predicted inc]− [EITCt−1 based on inct−1]
where zi,t(Eˆ[Pi,t|Pi,t−1]) is the EITC amount specific to each family based
on their predicted income and family structure. The TAXSIM generated
EITC amount is family specific: therefore, the treatment is more precise than
the previous two instruments. Furthermore, the instrument also exploits
variations in the state EITC amount by calculating a treatment amount
specific to each family.
In summary, the IV model yields,
∆yit = ∆Iitα + ∆X
′
itβ + w
′
iγ + ∆it (3.8)
where ∆Iit is instrumented by the three aforementioned instruments (∆z
IV
i ).
7
If estimates are consistent across the models using different forms of an in-
strument, then it provides stronger support for the finding.
7One of the potential issues with the proposed instruments is that all of them are still a
function of a lagged pretax income (Pi,t−1) so the coefficient estimate could still be biased
because of a serial correlation in income. Dahl and Lochner (2012) suggest including a
polynomial function of lagged pre-tax income to mitigate the issue. The inclusion of such
a polynomial function does not change the main finding.
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3.4 Data
The main source of data is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79) and its Child/Young Adult supplement. The NLSY79 gathered
information from people aged 14 to 21 as of December 31, 1978, represent-
ing the civilian, non-institutionalized population residing in the U.S. The
survey was conducted annually until 1994 and biennially afterwards. The
original sample consists of 12,686 individuals, 6,283 of whom are women.
The Child/Young Adult supplement consists of children born to the female
respondents of the NLSY79. The supplement collected child development
information – including children’s height and weight – biennially since 1986.
Children from the Child/Young Adult supplement are matched to their moth-
ers in the NLSY79 to create the sample used in this paper.
One of the major advantages of the data set is its extensive information on
various income components, which permits a calculation of the eligible EITC
amount.8 The NLSY79 began collecting information on whether or not a
respondent filed for the EITC and the amount she received only beginning
with the year 2000. Because the collected information is self-reported, it is
missing in most cases. Therefore, the eligible EITC amount for each family
is calculated using the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM
program.
By simulating the eligible EITC amount, I assume that all eligible indi-
viduals claim the benefits and fully comply with the program rules. Studies
support the assumption of full program compliance. For instance, Scholz
(1994) asserts that 80 to 86 percent of the taxpayers eligible for the EITC
appeared to have received the credit in 1990. A recent study on the EITC
compliance by the Internal Revenue Service finds that most EITC recipi-
ents are compliant, and even those who claim benefits despite their ineligible
status tend to have similar characteristics as the eligible population (IRS
2002a).
Another important advantage of the NLSY79 is its accurate measures of
children’s adiposity. The Child/Young Adult supplement contains informa-
8Both a respondent’s and her spouse’s wages and salaries, unemployment income, farm
or business income, welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food
stamps, Supplemental Security Income), veteran benefits, worker compensation, disability
benefits, and other income (child support, savings, rental, social security) are self-reported
in all survey years and are used to construct the pre- and post-tax income levels.
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tion on children’s height and weight, which are directly measured by an
interviewer in most cases. I create a normalized BMI measure with a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one based on the age- and sex-specific
standard (denoted as ZBMI). The ZBMI provides a better sense of children’s
weight status than BMI since the range for normal BMI varies by age and
gender.9 For instance, a 4-year old boy with a BMI of 18.5 is considered
“obese” whereas a 10-year old boy with the same BMI is “normal.” I also
use an indicator variable for a child’s BMI that surpasses the 85th percentile
(overweight or obese) as a dependent variable in some specifications since
obesity is a rather extreme health condition that is less likely to have been
prevalent when the majority of samples were collected.
After imposing minor sample restrictions, the final sample consists of
24,414 child-year observations spanning from 1986 to 2002. The observa-
tions with a marital status change within a two-year period are excluded
from the sample since a change in marital status could impact both family
income and children’s weight. Moreover, only children whose ages range from
four to fourteen years old are included in the sample. Imposing additional
sample restrictions to minimize measurement error in family income does not
change the main results.10
The summary statistics are reported in Table 3.1. The dependent variables
are presented in Panel A, and Panel B displays a list of regressors. The sample
mainly consists of young children, the average age of whom is eight. Since
the NLSY79 oversampled blacks and hispanics, the sample contains a greater
than population average number of black and hispanic children. The average
family income is about $34,000 in year 2000 dollars, which is slightly less
than the 1999 national median income level of $42,000. Approximately one
third of children in the sample are eligible for the EITC. These children are
more likely to be black or hispanic, obese with a higher BMI, and from lower
income families. Their mothers are also less likely to have been married in
the previous year and to have lived with both biological parents at age 14.
9Children with BMI greater than the 95th percentile based on the 2000 CDC sex- and
age-specific growth chart are categorized as “obese.”
10Following Dahl and Lochner (2012), children from military or over-sampled poor white
families, children whose family income exceeds $150,000, whose two-year change in family
income is larger than $40,000, or whose two-year change in welfare amount is greater than
$2,500 without a corresponding income change were all excluded in the more restrictive
sample.
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As Panel B demonstrates, several control variables are missing observa-
tions in the sample. Hence, a dummy variable for a missing observation is
constructed, and I fill in the missing values using values from the surrounding
years when possible. Of particular importance is the imputation method for
missing income. Using the panel nature of the data, I regress income on age
and age squared only for individuals over the age of 22 to impute the missing
income observations.11 The imputation procedure has a negligible effect on
the estimates.
To control for potential confounding factors, some specifications include
yearly state unemployment rates, a welfare reform indicator, and food stamp
program (also known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or
SNAP) rule change indicators. The yearly state unemployment rates are
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment
Statistics whereas the dates for the AFDC waiver and Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF) implementation are from Crouse (1999).12 The
food stamp program policy variables are from the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture’s Economic Research Service SNAP Policy Database. I extract only
the policy variables that researchers find to affect the program participa-
tion: the broad based categorical eligibility, finger printing, simplified re-
porting procedure, and short certification periods (Hanratty, 2006; Kabbani
and Wilde, 2003; Klerman and Danielson, 2011).
One final note addresses a more technical issue. Since respondents are
asked about their income in the previous year, a child’s adiposity measure
is regressed on one-year lagged family income although it is denoted as a
contemporaneous income. Furthermore, the lagged family income for the
first-differenced model is a two-year instead of a one-year lag since children’s
adiposity measures are surveyed biennially.
11More detailed information on the imputation procedure can be found in the appendix
of Dahl and Lochner (2012).
12The observations with missing geocode information were filled in using the surrounding
years. If the observations were still missing geographic information after the imputation
procedure, they were assigned with average yearly national unemployment rates or the
last year welfare reform occurred. The welfare reform indicator is constructed to equal
one for all of the years that the AFDC waiver or TANF was in place.
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3.5 The Effect of the EITC Income on Childhood
Obesity
This section begins by presenting the OLS estimates which illustrate a pos-
itive relationship between the EITC income and childhood obesity. I then
report the DD and IV estimates. All of the estimates imply that a policy-
driven increase in income leads to weight gain among children from the EITC-
eligible families.
3.5.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
The OLS model demonstrates that the relationship between income and chil-
dren’s weight differs depending on the type of income. The total family
income is negatively correlated with children’s body weight in column (1)
of Table 3.2 whereas the EITC income is positively correlated in column
(2). The results suggest that permanent income may affect children’s weight
differently from policy induced temporary income.
The observed relationship between income and children’s weight is likely
to suffer from omitted variable bias. The negative relationship between total
family income and children’s weight could result from the unobservable dif-
ferences among children along family income level. The positive relationship
between the EITC income and children’s weight could be driven by high obe-
sity rates of children from the EITC-eligible families compared with children
from higher income families receiving no EITC benefits.
In order to account for the potential source of bias in the relationship be-
tween EITC income and children’s weight, I consider two approaches. First,
I restrict the sample to only children whose families are most likely to be
affected by the EITC changes. Following Eissa and Hoyne (2004), I limit
the sample to children whose mothers have a high school education or less in
columns (3) and (4). Second, I employ the first-differenced model in column
(4). The first-differenced model removes any time-invariant heterogeneities
among children and thus, alleviates the potential endogeneity issue.
The positive relationship between the EITC income and children’s weight
is fairly consistent across the two approaches. Although the estimates become
less precise because of a smaller sample size, the overall estimates from the
restricted sample do not change much in column (3). The first-differenced
46
estimates in column (4) also demonstrate a positive relationship between the
EITC income and children’s weight.13 However, since the potential bias is
somewhat exacerbated in the first-differenced model, I present results from
the DD model in the following section.
3.5.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimates
The summary statistics of the restricted sample (children whose mothers
have a high school education or less) by family size highlight the importance
of controlling for group characteristics in the DD model. Table 3.3 indicates
that mothers with one child are slightly younger, less likely to be married,
and more likely to be from a better socioeconomic background. Children
from one-child families are also slightly younger, less likely to be a racial
minority, but more likely to be overweight or obese. Because of the observable
differences between two groups, the preferred DD model controls for group
characteristics as well as the time trend.
The DD estimates in Table 3.4 indicate that children from families with
two or more children experienced a larger weight gain compared with children
from one-child families after the OBRA 93. Specifications A through C of
column (1) indicate that the proportion of children categorized as overweight
or obese (BMI ≥ 85th percentile) increased by four to five percentage points
more in the treatment group (families with two or more children) than in
the control group. Considering that 25% of children in the pre-OBRA 93
sample were overweight or obese, the four percentage point increase is fairly
sizable. Moreover, the three percentage point increase in obesity rates in
column (2) is also fairly large given that the pre-treatment average obesity
rate was 13%. Figure 3.3 further demonstrates how the BMI distribution
of a treatment group developed a thicker right tail and, hence, a greater
proportion of overweight or obese children following the 1993 expansion.
The weight gain resulting from the expansion had a positive impact on
some children but a negative impact on others. Column (3) of Table 3.4
shows that the expansion reduced the proportion of underweight children by
2 to 3 percentage points. Therefore, some children became healthier as they
gained more weight after the OBRA 93. On the other hand, the expansion
13Although it is not shown here, the fixed effect model also gives similar estimates as
the first-differenced model.
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potentially had an adverse impact on other children’s overall health.14 Since
obesity is linked to a range of illnesses, an increased proportion of overweight
or obese children suggests an adverse health effect of the expansion.15 An
increased proportion of mothers reporting that their children suffered from
an illness requiring medical attention (column (4)) also indicates that the
overall health of children likely deteriorated after the expansion.
Of particular concern during the sample time period is the policy changes
that could have separately affected children’s weight. If potential confounders
are not accounted for in the model, the effect of other policy changes could
be mistakenly attributed to the effect of the EITC income. One of the po-
tential confounders is welfare reform. Several states began modifying provi-
sions of the existing welfare program in an effort to encourage employment,
which eventually culminated in the passage of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA 96). Stud-
ies show that a large number of previously unemployed mothers joined the
workforce because of the reform, and this could have had a separate effect
on children’s weight.16 Another potential confounder is a change in the food
stamp program. In the late 1990s, access to the food stamp program became
more restrictive. Although the eligibility restrictions were targeted exclu-
sively toward recent immigrants and able-bodied adults without dependents
and, thus, did not directly affect the sample at hand, the prevailing political
sentiment at the time could have deterred some eligible families from par-
ticipating (Figlio et al., 2000; Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999). Although the
effect of food stamp program participation on childhood obesity is ambigu-
ous (Gibson, 2004; Gibson, 2006; Hofferth and Curtin, 2005; Kreider et al.,
2012; Schmeiser, 2012), the changing food stamp program rules should be
addressed in the empirical model to mitigate the potential source of bias. For
instance, if families who were previously enrolled in the food stamp program
stopped participating as the EITC program expanded, a change in children’s
14Since Hoynes et al. (2012) state that the EITC had a positive impact on infant health,
their study initially seems contradictory to this paper’s finding. However, a closer look
at the study reveals that the authors used the incidence of low birthweight as a measure
for the infant health. Therefore, both studies concur that the EITC income increased
children’s body weight.
15Medical research links obesity to type 2 diabetes, heart diseases, and osteoarthritis
(Haslam and James, 2005; Mokdad et al., 2003; Sharma, 2003).
16See Blank (2002), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), and
Schoeni and Blank (2000) for detailed information on policy changes during the 1990s.
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weight because of a change in food stamp program participation might be
wrongly attributed to the effect of the EITC expansion.
Controlling for potential confounders has a modest effect on the estimates.
Specification D accounts for potential confounders by including additional
variables, such as yearly state unemployment rates, welfare reform indicators,
and indicators for food stamp program rules. The estimates are robust to the
specification controlling for potential confounders. While the DD estimates
provide a useful insight into the impact of the EITC expansion, part of the
estimated effect is driven by low-income mothers’ labor supply response. To
examine only the policy-driven income effect, I present the IV results in the
following section.
3.5.3 Instrumental Variable Estimates
The IV estimates indicate that a policy-driven increase in income leads to
weight gain by children from the EITC-eligible families. Using a simulated
change in the EITC amount as an instrument for the change in after-tax
family income, Table 3.5 shows separate IV estimates for each of the three
instruments. The first two columns present estimates from using the first
instrument in equation (3.5), whereas the next four columns correspond to
estimates using equation (3.6) and (3.7) respectively. The estimates vary
little across the models using different instruments. Table 3.5 shows that
a $1,000 increase in policy-driven income generates an increase in BMI by
0.02% to 0.03% of a standard deviation or an increase in the probability
of obesity by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points. Considering that the average
obesity rate of the sample is 16%, the effect is sizable. The probability of
being overweight or obese increases by 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points although
most of the estimates are not precise. Restricting the sample to only those
children whose mothers have a high school education or less barely changes
the estimates in columns (2), (4), and (6). Since the IV results are similar
across all models, I treat the regression model (5) as the baseline model for
all subsequent analysis.
Although the instruments in Table 3.5 remove any income effect emerging
from a maternal employment response, they do not account for a change in
maternal time spent with children. Table 3.6 addresses the issue by including
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various measures of parental employment. The second specification includes
total number of hours mothers worked during a current year while the third
specification controls for total number of hours that both parents worked dur-
ing a current year. Neither measure of labor supply has a significant impact
on the estimates. To address the concern that it is not the contemporaneous
labor supply but labor supply cumulated over time that affects children’s
weight, specification D includes an average number of hours per week moth-
ers worked since a child’s birth. Resulting estimates are slightly smaller than
the baseline estimates but not significantly different. On the other hand, the
general consensus in the literature is that the female labor supply response to
the EITC expansions was only at the extensive margin (employment) rather
than the intensive margin (number of hours). Therefore, I include mother’s
labor force participation status in specification E. Specification F contains
total number of hours mothers worked in addition to the labor force par-
ticipation status. The estimates from both specifications are similar to the
baseline estimates.
The adverse effect of policy-driven income is robust across different spec-
ifications controlling for potential confounding factors. Table 3.7 assesses
the importance of confounding factors in the estimated income effect. An
inclusion of year dummies to account for the secular time trend in obesity
rates results in slightly smaller coefficients (specification B). Specification C
restricts samples to only years prior to the PRWORA 96 since it was one
of the most significant legislative acts during the time period. The resulting
estimates are larger than the baseline estimates but not by a statistically
significant amount. Last, I include yearly state unemployment rates, wel-
fare reform indicators, and food stamp policy indicators in specification D.
Specification E includes year dummies in addition to the control variables in
specification D. Both of the specifications yield consistent estimates, strongly
corroborating the finding from DD estimates.
I further explore the potentially heterogenous impact of family income on
children’s weight in Table 3.8. Previous studies suggest that income has a
larger effect on the development of low-socioeconomic children and younger
children (Akee et al., 2013; Dahl and Lochner, 2012). Schmeiser (2009) also
finds that income affects women’s weight but not men’s. To demonstrate the
effect income has on children’s weight by their socioeconomic status, age,
race, or gender, Table 3.8 reports IV estimates by the subgroups. Only the
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coefficients from using an obesity indicator as a dependent variable are pre-
sented. As expected, a greater proportion of children from low-socioeconomic
backgrounds are obese and are eligible for the benefits. Unlike the income
effect on adult weight, the effect on children’s weight is similar across gender
(see column (1) of Table 3.8). The weight of female children is slightly more
responsive to income than that of male children, which may be a precur-
sor to the heterogenous income effect among adults. The difference between
female and male children, however, is not statistically significant. On the
other hand, family income does have a larger effect on younger children and
children from more disadvantaged backgrounds. For instance, income has a
greater effect on children who are younger than ten years old than on those
who are at least ten years old (column (3)). This is consistent with the studies
highlighting the importance of parental resources, especially during the early
years of a child’s life (Duncan et al., 1998; Levy and Duncan, 1999). Racial
minority children (column (2)) and children from a single parent household
(column (4)) are not only more likely to be obese than their counterparts,
but their body weight is also more responsive to income changes.
3.6 Discussion of the Main Findings
The IV estimates indicate that an increase in policy-driven income leads to
weight gain by children from the EITC-eligible families. Although the find-
ing is consistent with other studies investigating the causal effect of income
on body weight (Akee et al., 2013; Schmeiser, 2009), it seems rather coun-
terintuitive since more income is generally considered beneficial. In order to
understand why policy-driven income has an adverse impact on children’s
weight, this section begins by considering the unique features of the EITC
income. Then, I propose several hypotheses related to the features. Last, I
discuss policy implications of my finding.
Compared to income earned through salaries or wages, the EITC income
has three unique features. First, the EITC benefit is disbursed annually in
a lump sum after the tax return is filed. While recipients can collect their
benefits at a monthly frequency using the EITC Advance program, only a
small percentage of people takes advantage of the option.17 Second, the EITC
17Only 1.1 percent of the EITC recipients took advantage of the advance payment option
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income is temporary income. In order to be eligible for the benefit, one must
have both earned and AGI below a threshold that varies by year and by
number of qualifying children.18 Once children become non-dependents, or
if earned income exceeds the threshold, families are no longer eligible for the
benefit. Finally, only low-income working families receive the EITC benefit.
The lump sum and temporary nature of the EITC income reveals how
beneficiaries of the expansions spend their additional income. People tend
to spend their tax refunds on nondurables, such as food away from home,
apparel, vacation, and paying down debts (Agarwal et al., 2007; Johnson
et al., 2006; Souleles, 2002). Romich and Weisner (2000) also point out
that families often prioritize expenses related to children when budgeting
the EITC income. Furthermore, families receiving additional food stamp or
cash benefits tend to increase their overall food expenditure (Hoynes and
Schanzenbach, 2009). Therefore, beneficiaries of the EITC expansions likely
increase their overall food expenditure by taking children out to restaurants
more frequently or buying them a larger quantity of high-caloric snacks. On
the other hand, the lump sum nature of the EITC income can generate an
irregular food consumption pattern. Studies on food stamp consumption
demonstrate that people spend most of their benefits immediately upon re-
ceipt, leading to a volatile food security status and inducing unhealthy binge
eating behaviors (Townsend et al, 2001). A similar mechanism may be at
work with the EITC income.
Regardless of how recipients spend their additional income, the main find-
ing clearly demonstrates that children from the EITC-eligible families con-
sume more calories when their families receive extra money. Why do families
consume more calories instead of spending extra money on higher quality
low-caloric food? The first explanation involves low-income families’ lack
of nutrition knowledge. Research shows that a person’s diet and nutrition
knowledge is closely related to the quality of his diet (Axelson et al., 1985;
Blaylock et al., 1999; Wardle et al., 2000). Low-income parents may have lim-
ited information on what types of food are healthy or how to cook healthily.
As a result, with additional income, low-income families simply eat more of
in 1998.
18Earned income includes wages and salary, business self-employment income, and farm
self-employment income. The AGI is calculated by subtracting a tax payer’s eligible
deduction amount from earned income.
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what they have been eating, which is high-caloric unhealthy food (Beydoun
and Wang, 2008; Gibson et al., 1998; Wolfe and Campbell, 1993; ). An
alternative argument is that parents are knowledgable about nutrition but
cannot provide healthy food to children because of lack of resources. Low-
income working mothers face more barriers in caring for children than higher
income mothers. They are more likely to rely on an informal child care ar-
rangement because of limited access to quality center-based care. Children
who are either at home alone or at a substandard child care facility consume
more high-caloric food without proper supervision. The third explanation
is a family’s budget constraint. Even with additional income, families still
cannot afford to buy more expensive healthier alternatives. Finally, the last
explanation lies with taste or preference. The increase in caloric intake can
simply be driven by a family’s taste for high-caloric food (Richards et al.,
2007).
The policy implication of the finding varies depending on the underlying
mechanism behind children’s high caloric intake. If a lack of information is
the main mechanism, public health efforts can be directed at educating low-
income families on diet and nutrition. Community outreach programs that
teach families nutritional contents of food or quick ways to prepare healthy
meals could be an effective strategy. On the other hand, if limited access
to quality child care is the main force behind children’s weight gain, public
policies helping working mothers would be the most effective solution (Fuller
et al, 2002). For instance, government can increase access to quality child care
by offering a sizable subsidy to low-income working mothers or tax incentives
to facilities that operate quality child care in low-income neighborhoods.
Finally, if a budget constraint is what drives children’s high caloric intake,
government can make healthier food more affordable by subsidizing it or by
providing families with a larger cash transfer.
The difference between the effect of cash versus the effect of an in-kind
transfer further offers potential policy implication. Programs such as the
SNAP provide in-kind transfers to reduce food insecurity whereas the EITC
program provides cash in order to improve a recipient’s overall well-being.19
How families respond to different types of transfers could guide policymakers
in designing an effective policy. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) state that
19The food stamp program provides coupons (nowadays an electronic debit card), which
can only be used to purchase food.
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a dollar in cash and a dollar in food stamp benefits have the same effect
of increasing an overall food expenditure. Their finding suggests that an
increase in food stamp benefits may have a similar impact on children’s
weight as does an increase in policy-driven income.20
Given that only low-income families are affected by the EITC expansions,
and the policy-driven income is a temporary income shock, the paper’s find-
ing has limited generalizability. The income effect identified here is a local
average treatment effect. Consequently, the positive IV coefficient captures
the income effect on children only from low-income families and is unlikely to
extend to those from higher income families. Besides, despite the plausible
difference between a permanent versus a temporary income shock, empirical
evidence suggests that both types of shocks induce a similar response, at
least among low-income families. The finding that policy-driven income in-
creases the weight of children from low-income families is consistent with the
inverse U-shaped relationship between permanent family income and chil-
dren’s weight (Jo, 2014).
The main finding of my paper implies that, despite its success in increasing
female labor force participation, the EITC expansion potentially had an ad-
verse impact on children’s health. The expansion has been previously shown
to improve maternal health (Averett and Wang, 2013; Evans and Garthwaite,
2010) and infant health (Hoynes et al., 2012); on the contrary, the finding
here suggests that the expansion adversely impacted children’s health by in-
creasing childhood obesity. Moreover, the IV result suggests that part of the
increase was generated by a policy-driven increase in income.
3.7 Conclusion
Unlike the Medicaid program, which has an explicit goal of improving a re-
cipient’s health, a cash transfer program like the EITC has a more general
purpose of improving a recipient’s overall well-being. Given such high obe-
sity rates among children from low-income families and the significance of
20Researchers generally find that participating in the food stamp program increases
the weight of female adults (Chen et al., 2005; Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk, 2008), but
the effect on children’s weight has been mixed because of the difficulty in addressing
selection bias (Gibson, 2004; Gibson, 2006; Hofferth and Curtin, 2005; Kreider et al.,
2012; Schmeiser, 2012).
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the EITC program for low-income families, it is crucial to understand what
role policy-driven income plays in increasing childhood obesity. In this pa-
per, I examine the impact of policy-driven income on childhood obesity by
exploiting the expansions of the EITC program in the 1980s and 1990s.
Family income and children’s weight overall exhibit a negative association
among families from all income levels. However, the EITC income and chil-
dren’s weight illustrate a positive association. The DD estimates imply that
a child’s probability of obesity increased by 3 percentage points following
the largest EITC expansion. Since part of the observed effect is plausibly
driven by an increase in maternal employment, I employ an IV strategy
to identify only the income effect generated by exogenous policy changes.
The IV estimates indicate that a $1,000 increase in family income generates
an approximately 0.02% of a standard deviation increase in BMI or a 0.5
percentage point increase in the probability of obesity. The finding is robust
across various specifications accounting for other policy changes and parental
working hours.
The paper’s main finding implies that the EITC has an adverse impact on
childhood obesity. However, there are several caveats. First, the identified
income effect has a limited generalizability because of certain characteris-
tics of the EITC income. The finding only applies to children from the
EITC-eligible families and to a particular type of income shock. On the
other hand, even though the finding suggests a potentially negative health
consequence for some children, I do not argue against the EITC program.
Previous studies find a positive effect of the EITC on multiple dimensions,
hence, the program’s benefits outweigh its potential harms. The paper high-
lights the importance of investigating even seemingly irrelevant outcomes to
understand the full consequence of a program.
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Figure 3.1: Federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Max Benefit Amount
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Figure 3.2: Federal EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children
Figure 1a: Federal EITC Schedules for Families with Two or More Children (Year 2000 Dollars)
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Figure 3.3: BMI Distribution Before and After OBRA 93
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable All Sample Not Eligible Eligible
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Dependent variables
BMI (body mass index) 18.30 18.07 18.85
ZBMI (normalized BMI) 0.26 0.23 0.32
% obese 0.15 0.15 0.16
% overweight 0.14 0.14 0.15
≥ 85th BMI percentile 0.29 0.29 0.32
Panel B. Regressors
Family income ($1K, year 2000 dollars) 34.4 41.48 17.41
Male 0.51 0.51 0.50
Black 0.30 0.25 0.42
Hispanic 0.20 0.19 0.21
Age 8.50 8.36 8.86
No sibling 0.13 0.12 0.15
One sibling 0.40 0.42 0.35
≥ two siblings 0.47 0.46 0.49
Mother’s age 32.78 33.00 32.23
Father’s age 35.00 35.26 33.94
Mother was married last year 0.67 0.77 0.45
Number of adults in household 1.89 1.94 1.76
Mother lived with both parents at age 14 0.65 0.68 0.57
Highest grade completed by mother’s father 8.64 9.19 7.31
Highest grade completed by mother’s mother 9.72 10.07 8.88
Proportion of self-reported adiposity measures 0.25 0.26 0.23
Missing observation indicators
Earning 0.03 0.05 0.00
Father’s age 0.04 0.04 0.04
Mother lived with both parents at age 14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of adults in household 0.00 0.00 0.00
Highest grade completed by mother’s father 0.16 0.14 0.21
Highest grade completed by mother’s mother 0.06 0.06 0.08
Self-reported adiposity measures 0.14 0.14 0.14
Notes: Summary statistics presented here only includes observations used in the baseline IV regression. Statis-
tics for spouse-related variables are calculated conditional on mothers being married. Whether a child is
“obese” or not is determined using the 2000 Centers for Disease Control sex- and age-specific growth chart. If
a child’s BMI is greater than the 95th percentile, then he/she is considered “obese.” If it is between the 85th
and 95th percentiles, he/she is categorized as “overweight.” A family income variable is net of all taxes and
includes the EITC benefit as well as non-taxable income.
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Table 3.2: The Impact of Family Income on Children’s
Weight: OLS and First-Differenced Estimates
OLS OLS OLS Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. ZBMI
Family income ($10K) -0.014***
(0.005)
EITC ($10K) 0.386** 0.246 0.290*
(0.166) (0.193) (0.176)
Panel B. Obese
Family income ($10K) -0.005***
(0.001)
EITC ($10K) 0.060 -0.012 0.046
(0.047) (0.055) (0.048)
Panel C. ≥ 85th
Family income ($10K) -0.005***
(0.002)
EITC ($10K) 0.109* 0.044 0.004
(0.058) (0.068) (0.055)
Sample all all ≤HS ≤HS
N 24,414 24,414 16,001 16,001
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regres-
sion models (1)–(3) include year fixed effects and all of the control variables listed in
Panel B of Table 1. The first-differenced (Diff) regression model (4) is estimated using
the first-differences with gender, race, age, and year dummy variables. The fixed ef-
fect model, not shown here, gives similar estimates as those from the first-differenced
model. Standard errors are clustered at the family level.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for the Treatment Group (Children from Fami-
lies with Two or More Children) and the Control Group (Children from Fam-
ilies with One Child)
1 Child 2+ Children Difference
(1) (2) (3)
BMI 18.27 18.16 0.12
(0.17) (0.14) (0.44)
% obese 0.17 0.14 0.04***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
≥ 85th BMI percentile 0.32 0.27 0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Family income ($1,000) 23.84 25.32 -1.48**
(0.46) (0.15) (0.48)
Male 0.50 0.51 -0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Black 0.29 0.34 -0.06***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Hispanic 0.18 0.23 -0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Children’s age 7.74 8.18 -0.43***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.10)
Mother’s age 29.10 29.65 -0.55***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
Mother was married last year 0.47 0.60 -0.13***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
# of adults in household 1.99 1.90 0.08**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Mother lived with both parents at age 14 0.63 0.58 0.06***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Highest grade completed by mother’s father 8.31 7.24 1.07***
(0.12) (0.04) (0.13)
Highest grade completed by mother’s mother 9.35 8.76 0.59***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.10)
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table demonstrates the differences in average group charac-
teristics between the treatment and control groups.
60
Table 3.4: The Impact of Income on Children’s Health Outcomes
(Children Whose Mothers Have a High School Education or Less): DD esti-
mates
≥ 85th Obese Underweight
(1) (2) (3)
A. No controls 0.052*** 0.021 -0.033***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.009)
B. No controls, child FE 0.038* 0.031** -0.023**
(0.020) (0.015) (0.010)
C. With controls, child FE 0.039** 0.030** -0.021**
(0.020) (0.015) (0.010)
D. With controls, child FE, state unemp. 0.039** 0.030** -0.021**
rate, welfare & food stamp policies (0.020) (0.015) (0.010)
Pre-OBRA 93 average (1985–1993) 0.25 0.13 0.10
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each column and row combination represents a separate
regression from using the DD equation (3.3) of Section 3. Specification A presents a simple DD estimate
without any control variables, which is equivalent to the simple mean comparison. Specifications B through
D include child fixed effects (FE). Specifications C and D include child and family characteristics listed in
Panel B of Table 3.1 to account for the group differences. Standard errors are clustered at the family level.
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Table 3.7: IV Estimates Accounting for the State Policy Changes
ZBMI Obese ≥ 85th
(1) (2) (3)
A. Baseline 0.197*** 0.046*** 0.025
(0.054) (0.014) (0.016)
B. Year dummies 0.124** 0.043*** 0.020
(0.052) (0.014) (0.016)
C. Prior to the PRWORA 96 (1986–1996) 0.323*** 0.061*** 0.055**
(0.086) (0.020) (0.025)
D. State unemployment rate, welfare 0.187*** 0.047*** 0.024
& food stamp policies (0.053) (0.014) (0.016)
E. Year dummies, state unemployment rate, 0.124** 0.044*** 0.021
welfare & food stamp policies (0.052) (0.014) (0.016)
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All of the regression models include children’s gender and
race indicators. The baseline IV regression model (specification A) is obtained from column (5) of
Table 3.5. Standard errors are clustered at the family level.
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Table 3.9: Proportion of Eligible Sample at Each Region of the
EITC Schedule
Year # of children % eligible Phase-in Flat Phase-out
1985 3,096 0.29 0.52 0.12 0.32
1987 3,096 0.33 0.46 0.02 0.52
1989 2,968 0.32 0.33 0.17 0.50
1991 3,301 0.30 0.32 0.21 0.47
1993 3,630 0.30 0.30 0.23 0.47
1995 3,626 0.30 0.27 0.11 0.61
1997 3,333 0.29 0.31 0.10 0.59
1999 2,423 0.27 0.26 0.13 0.61
2001 2,037 0.22 0.28 0.07 0.64
Total 27,510 0.29 0.34 0.13 0.52
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPACT OF MATERNAL
EMPLOYMENT ON CHILDREN’S
ADIPOSITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE
CHINA’S LABOR POLICY REFORM
4.1 Introduction
As in many developed countries, China has experienced a rapid growth in
adiposity in the past decade. Wang et al. (2007) note that the prevalence of
overweight and obesity among adults almost doubled from 14.6 to 21.8% in
China. Children, who are especially vulnerable to a rapidly changing envi-
ronment, also experienced a significant increase in obesity rates. Meanwhile,
malnutrition and underweight remains a problem in China, particularly in
rural areas (Brauw and Mu, 2011; Doak et al., 2000). Underweight status
in childhood has a long-term health consequence that is as bad as that of
childhood obesity. While a growing number of studies examine the poten-
tial factors affecting children’s body weight in developed countries, only few
researchers have focused on developing countries.
In this paper, we investigate how maternal employment affects childhood
adiposity by exploiting a labor policy reform in China. We emphasize the
effect of maternal employment considering the significant role mothers play
on child health in developed countries.1 Previous studies demonstrate that
maternal employment has an adverse effect on a range of health outcomes,
such as infant mortality, birth weight, illness, and risk of obesity (Anderson
et al., 2003; Gennetian et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2007; Morrill, 2011; Ruhm,
2000). Furthermore, the studies indicate that the effect is not homogeneous
across all children. Maternal employment reduces a risk of obesity among
1Previous literature finds a weak role of paternal employment on children’s weight
(Greve, 2011; Phipps et al., 2006) since fathers tend to contribute less time on activities
like cooking or a childcare (Cawley and Liu, 2012). We discuss the potential effect of a
father as a supplement in the later section.
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children from disadvantaged backgrounds while exacerbating it among those
from more advantaged backgrounds (Anderson et al., 2003; Ruhm, 2008).
Maternal employment could affect children’s weight through a number of
channels. Additional income from employment increases a family’s financial
resources and thereby could have a positive impact on children. In the US,
family income and childhood obesity exhibits an overall negative correlation
suggesting a potentially beneficial effect of a greater financial resource on
children’s adiposity (Jo, 2014). On the other hand, an increase in maternal
employment reduces the amount of time mothers spend with children, which
likely has a detrimental effect (Cawley and Liu, 2012).
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we explore the basic
relationship between maternal employment and childhood adiposity in China
using the least squares framework. To account for the omitted variable bias
in OLS estimates, we then employ a difference-in-difference (DD) strategy
utilizing a change in number of hours worked originating from the legislative
action in China. Since a reduction in the number of hours mothers worked
generated by the reform is exogenous to children’s weight, it allows us to
identify a causal effect of maternal employment. Furthermore, since the
reform only affected mothers who were employed in private or public sectors
but not those who were self-employed, we compare the adiposity outcomes
of children with wage earning mothers to those with self-employed mothers.
The least squares and DD estimates reveal an intriguing result. Consistent
with existing studies in the US the least squares estimates imply an adverse
effect of maternal employment on children’s adiposity. Mothers who work
more tend to have children who are more likely to be overweight or obese.
However, the DD estimate suggests that a decline in number of maternal
work hours induced a weight gain among children. The weight gain seems
to be driven by a change in a mother’s behavior after the reform, leading to
children’s greater caloric intake. Although the weight gain may have had a
harmful effect on some children, others benefited from it as they became less
likely to be underweight. Further investigation reveals that the effect was
greater for younger, male children from low-socioeconomic families.
The paper contributes to the literature in three important ways. Studies
examining the impact of maternal employment on childhood adiposity often
suffer from a potential endogeneity issue. A few recent studies address the
issue using various econometrics approach (Anderson et al., 2003; Ruhm,
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2008). Our paper provides additional evidence on the causal effect of ma-
ternal employment. In addition, although previous studies demonstrate that
maternal employment tends to have an adverse effect on children’s health,
no study has yet to separate the effect of maternal time spent with chil-
dren from that of income. We attempt to decompose the effect of maternal
employment by taking advantage of a unique policy shock in China that
presumably reduced the number of work hours without altering a worker’s
wage. Finally, the paper is one of the few papers examining a potential fac-
tor affecting childhood adiposity in developing countries. With remarkably
high female labor force participation rates in China, examining the potential
consequences of maternal employment has an important policy implication.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the
labor policy reform and discusses its potential impact on children’s adipos-
ity. Section 3 describes the dataset and empirical framework is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 reports the results and Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Description of the Labor Policy Reform in China
The paper takes advantage of the labor policy reform that reduced the num-
ber of work hours in China during the 1990s. In March of 1994, the Chinese
government amended the existing labor legislation to reduce the number of
work hours from 48 to 60 hours per week (six days per week with 8-10 hours
per day) to 44 hours per week (five and six days rotation with 8 hours per
day). A further change went into effect in May of 1995. The State Council
ratified the legislation with the 8-hour work day for a maximum of 44 hours
per week.2 This reform applied to all employees in the government sector,
public institutions, and enterprises. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates the legisla-
tive action effectively reduced the average number of hours worked per week
by full-time mothers from around 50 hours before 1995 to 45 hours after 1995
(top left panel). The other two panels indicate that the change in number
of hours worked per week is driven mostly by a change in number of days
worked per week rather than number of hours worked per day.
A change in the number of hours worked generated by the policy reform
is unrelated to other factors that affect children’s weight. The reform was
2Similar legislative changes went into effect in South Korea during the 1990s.
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motivated by three factors. First, China was one of the very few countries in
the 1990s to adopt the six-day work schedule. The Chinese government de-
cided to align the work schedule of China with an overall trend in the world.
Second, the effective working hours were low although employees were re-
quired to work 48 to 60 hours per week before the reform. The reform was
aimed to improving the managerial system and enhancing the productivity
of workers in the government, institutions, and enterprises. Third, the Chi-
nese government was attempting to shift the source of economic growth from
export driven to domestic consumption driven by reducing work hours and
increasing leisure time. Furthermore, through the reform, the Chinese gov-
ernment hoped to improve the quality of life by providing individuals with
free time for human capital accumulation, childcare, and leisure.
Our main empirical strategy exploits the fact that the reform did not apply
to self-employed workers. Employees of private (collectives, cooperatives, and
private enterprises) and public sectors (government units, public institutions,
and state owned enterprises (SOEs)) experienced a shock to their number
of work hours by the reform, but not self-employed workers.3 Figure 4.2
demonstrates that the average number of hours worked per week for full-time
self-employed workers stayed constant at approximately 50 hours whereas
that for wage earners decreased by six hours after the reform. Again the
decrease was mostly driven by the reduction in the number of days worked
rather than the number of hours worked per day.
Three features of the reform are noteworthy. The reform was not legally
enforced but was rather proposed as a guideline. Therefore, public firms likely
followed the rule more strictly than private firms. Figure 4.3 demonstrates
that public sector workers experienced a larger reduction in work hours com-
pared to private sector or self-employed workers. Second, the reform affected
all workers regardless of their gender, thus, it is important to control for po-
tential effect of paternal employment. A reduction in paternal employment
could amplify the maternal employment effect or mitigate it. If fathers spend
3The original question in the survey asks wage earning respondents to categorize them-
selves into four main employment sectors: state, large collectives, small collectives, and
private. Literature is not conclusive on whether to define collectives as public or private
sector (see Wang (2012) for an example). Therefore, we treat them as part of the private
sector. The categorization of collectives is not very important in our analysis since the
treatment group contains both private and public sector employees. The main findings in
the paper are robust to the exclusion of collective employees from the sample and to the
categorization of them as public sector employees.
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their extra time taking care of children or helping out with household chores,
it could magnify the benefit of reduced maternal work hours.4 On the other
hand, fathers may not participate in child care and thus could impose a neg-
ligible or no impact on the effect of maternal employment (Hamermesh et
al., 2005). While studies in developed countries generally find a weak or no
impact of paternal employment on child outcomes, we take several empirical
approaches to deal with the issue (Courtemanche, 2009; Greve, 2011; Phipps
et al., 2006). Lastly, we cannot overlook the role of income. The revised
labor policy did not specify whether firms should adjust yearly wage based
on new work hours, especially for those who are paid by hour. We expect
yearly wage to decrease with the adoption of new work hours with a greater
reduction for private sector workers.5 A reduction in yearly wage directly
affects the household budget and thus, likely has a detrimental impact on
outcomes for children.
The SOE reform in the late 1990s is a potential confounding factor in our
model. In 1997, China launched a labor retrenchment reform in SOEs to
modernize firms and improve efficiency (Appleton et al., 2002). As a result,
SOEs began adopting a modern management system and laying off redun-
dant workers. The laid-off workers also lost their employee benefits, including
pensions and health care (He et al, 2014). Since the SOE retrenchment indi-
rectly affects children’s health status through directly impacting employment
status of those working in SOEs, we take several approaches to resolving the
issue. The detailed discussion is presented in Section 4.
4.3 Data
The main source of data is the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
conducted by the Carolina Population Center and the National Institute of
Nutrition and Food Safety. The survey selected an initial sample of 3,759
households from eight provinces in China using a multistage random cluster
4Cawley and Liu (2012) find that 15% of the fewer minutes spent by working mothers
on activities that relate to child health is offset by increases in time by fathers.
5We suspect that workers paid hourly certainly experienced a reduction in yearly wage,
whereas those paid yearly are less likely to have experienced a change. However, such
information is not available in the CHNS.
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sample design.6 The CHNS began collecting information biennially since
1989 from all individuals residing in the sample households. The study has
an unbalanced panel structure, where information from the initial sample was
collected in two consecutive rounds (1989 and 1991) until new households
were added in 1993 to replace the non-participants. At each round, samples
were added to replace non-participating households.7 We use the first five
waves of data from 1989 to 2000.8
Despite a number of shortcomings the CHNS is the best available dataset
to study the effect of maternal employment on children’s adiposity in China.
The main drawbacks of the CHNS are that it is not nationally representative,
has an unbalanced panel structure, and contains a fairly modest number of
observations. The survey is not nationally representative because sampling
weights are not available. However, it is the only source of publicly available
information on health and nutrition of children in China with a longitudinal
structure. Furthermore, the survey reflects sociodemographic characteris-
tics that are comparable to the national average (State Statistical Bureau
of China, 2002). Previous studies indicate that the adiposity trend of the
CHNS, in particular, is similar to that from nationally representative sur-
veys, such as the Chinese National Survey on Students’ Constitution and
Health or the China National Nutrition Survey (Ji and Cheng, 2009; Wang
et al., 2007). One of the major advantages of the CHNS is that it contains
not only interviewer-measured height and weight information but also other
measures of adiposity, such as triceps skinfold thickness and upper arm cir-
cumference, which are not commonly available in survey data (Lakdawalla
and Reif, 2015). In addition, it contains extensive information on family’s
socioeconomic characteristics.
We construct several measures of the key outcome variable, a child’s adi-
posity. First, we determine whether a child is obese or not using his Body
6The eight provinces are Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaon-
ing, and Shandong. Heilongjiang Province was added only since 1995. For a detailed
description of the data collection method, see Liu et al. (2013) and Popkin et al. (2010).
7The survey response rate was approximately 90% at a household level (Popkin et al.,
2010).
8Although four additional waves of surveys (2004, 2006, 2009, 2011) are currently avail-
able, we exclude them from our analysis for two reasons. First, the attrition rate of the
CHNS is high so that very few respondents who participated in the pre-1995 survey still
remained in the latest waves. Second, China’s economy and labor market changed dra-
matically in the 2000s, thus, other confounding factors may bias our result with inclusion
of additional waves.
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Mass Index (BMI) and the sex- and age-specific 2000 CDC growth chart.9
We also use an indicator variable for a child’s BMI surpassing the 85th per-
centile (overweight or obese) as a dependent variable in some specifications.
In addition, to provide a more continuous measure of a child’s adiposity, we
create a normalized BMI measure (ZBMI) with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one based on the age- and sex-specific standard. A normalized
BMI gives a better sense of how children’s weights are changing relative to
their peers, since the range for normal BMI varies by age and gender. For
instance, a 4-year old boy with a BMI of 18.5 would be considered “obese”,
whereas a 10-year old boy with the same BMI would be considered “normal.”
Lastly, since a conventional way of determining adiposity may not be appro-
priate for Asian children (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008; Deurenberg et al.,
1998; Lu and Goldman, 2010; Misra, 2003; Wang et al. 1994), we employ
a few alternative measures of adiposity – obesity status using BMI cutoffs
specific for Chinese children, triceps skinfold thickness, upper arm fat area
estimate – to provide additional evidence on our finding.10
We use three distinct measures of maternal labor supply. The average
number of hours worked per week is constructed using two variables available
in the dataset: the average number of days worked per week and the number
of hours worked per day in the past year. In addition, we create the total
number of hours worked per year using the number of months worked per
year. These measures allow us to distinguish between “mothers who work
at a high intensity but intermittently” from “mothers who work at a low
intensity but consistently.” We also utilize the average number of days worked
per week, which is obtained directly from the survey and the key policy
instrument in the reform. After dropping children with missing key variables
(height, weight, and parental employment) and those without at least one
observation before and after the policy reform, our final sample consists of
approximately 2,000 children between two to seventeen years old.
9The BMI is created by dividing weight in kilograms by the square of height in meters
(kg/m2). Children with a BMI greater than the 95th percentile based on the 2000 CDC
growth chart are categorized as “obese.”
10Although the Chinese-specific obesity cutoffs seem like a better choice for this paper
(Ji and Cheng, 2009), we use the CDC cutoffs for the following reasons. First, Chinese-
specific cutoffs tend to overestimate obesity or overweight. Second, they provide cutoffs
for neither underweight children nor children under 7 years old.
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4.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we present an empirical framework to estimate the impact of
maternal employment on children’s adiposity. The basic model is,
yit = αPit +X
′
itβ + ri + eiht, (4.1)
where yit is a child i’s adiposity status at time t, Pit is a total number of
hours worked by the mother, and Xit denotes a vector of child and family
characteristics. It consists of age and sex of children, household size, na-
tionality, mother’s and father’s ages along with their education levels, a time
trend, regional effects and missing variable indicators. ri denotes child fixed
effects, which we include in some specifications.
Implicit in the basic model is that we are estimating the effect of contem-
porary labor supply rather than an accumulated labor supply over a child’s
lifetime. Although some studies use the average number of hours worked
in a child’s lifetime as a measure of labor supply, we use the contemporary
value because of a lack of employment history in the CHNS (Anderson et al.,
2003). We believe in the case of China, maternal labor supply tends to be
fairly constant throughout a woman’s lifetime and thus is a reasonable proxy
for her average lifetime labor supply. Nevertheless, we also utilize a brief em-
ployment history of mothers available during survey periods as robustness
checks.
The coefficient of interest, α, is likely to be biased because of a potential
endogeneity issue. An endogeneity issue arises because of a common factor
that influences maternal employment as well as children’s adiposity. For in-
stance, mothers who work more are likely to come from low socioeconomic
households where children are also more likely to be exposed to an environ-
ment that is harmful for their weight. In this case, the observed relationship
between maternal employment and children’s adiposity is a mere correlation
not causal.
In order to address potential endogeneity issue in the least squares model
(4.1), we employ a DD strategy. Since the policy had a differential effect
on wage earners versus self-employed workers, we define a treatment group
as children whose mothers are wage earners and a control group as children
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whose mothers are self-employed prior to the reform in 1995. The DD model
yields,
yit = θ(wage earneri) + λ(year1995t) + γ(wage earneri)(year1995t) (4.2)
+X ′itρ+ ri + iht
where wage earneri is a dummy variable indicating whether a mother is
a wage earner at either a public or a private sector before the reform. The
year1995t indicates treatment effect that is common across the treatment and
control groups. X ′it is the same vector of child and family characteristics as
the least square model. The main coefficient of interest is γ, which captures
how the adiposity outcomes of children from the treatment group evolves
differently from those of the control group after the reform.
Table 4.1 indicates that the treatment and control groups are different
in a number of observable dimensions. Panel A shows that children in the
treatment group are eight percentage points more likely to be underweight.
Children from the treatment group are also five percentage points more likely
to be overweight or obese, although the difference is not statistically signif-
icant. The treatment group parents are slightly older and more educated.
While parents from the treatment group work longer hours on average, they
tend to earn slightly less than the control group parents. Not surprisingly,
a higher percentage of fathers in the control group are self-employed, which
reflects a matching of parental occupations. Some parental behaviors and
children’s nutrition intake also differs by the treatment status. Both parents
in the treatment group are more likely to engage in household chores, such
as cooking, grocery shopping or laundry. They tend to spend a longer time
doing household chores as well. The treatment group children tend to con-
sume higher calories, fat, and protein than their counterparts in the control
group.
The main identifying assumption is that children in the treatment and
control groups would have exhibited the same outcome trend in the absence
of a treatment. We include a vector of child and family characteristics (X ′it)
from Table 4.1 to control for the observable differences. We assume that any
unobservable difference between treatment and control groups is captured by
θ or ri. We cannot directly test whether the groups would have exhibited
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the same trend in the absence of a treatment after controlling for the group
differences. Nevertheless, we examine the pre-reform difference in outcomes
to test for the preexisting trend.
We conduct several robustness checks to address the issue of a confounding
factor. First, we exclude children whose mothers switch employment status
(who either lose employment or is newly employed). A labor supply change
at the extensive margin (employment status change) likely has a greater
impact on children’s weight than a change at the intensive margin (change
in number of hours worked). Therefore, an inclusion of such observations
likely biases the estimate upwards. To address the confounding effect of
the SOE retrenchment more specifically, we test the DD model using three
different samples. Our first sample excludes any mothers who were employed
in the state sector and became unemployed. We further restrict the sample by
excluding all children whose mothers are employed in the state sector, thereby
limiting the treatment group to only children whose mothers are employed in
the private sector. Lastly, we exclude mothers who switch sectors in order to
address the issue of children switching from a treatment to a control group
and vice versa.
Lastly, we examine the potential mechanisms and heterogeneity of the
effect. We examine the difference in parental behaviors and children’s nu-
tritional intake between the treatment and control group after the reform.
Moreover, we explore the heterogeneous effect of maternal employment by
examining subgroups of children.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 The effect of maternal employment on children’s
adiposity: OLS
To examine the overall relationship between maternal employment and child-
hood adiposity, we first present the OLS estimates in Table 4.2. Panels A
and B present the results from models using two distinct measures of mater-
nal labor supply. In addition to the two measures (hours worked per year
and hours worked per week), we also report the result from using days per
week worked. The days per week worked was a policy instrument in the 1995
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reform, which allows us to measure the direct impact of the reform.
In general, the three measures generate a consistent and comparable result.
First, mothers who work more have children who are overweight or obese.
Column (2) of Table 4.2 indicates that an additional day of mothers work
is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in a child’s probability of
being overweight or obese. For every 10 hours a mother works per week and
for every 1000 hours of a mother works per year, the probability increases
by 1.2 and 1.8 percentage points respectively. The finding is consistent with
the studies from developed countries (Gennetian et al., 2010; Morrill, 2011;
Ruhm, 2000; Ruhm, 2008). Second, estimates are comparable across differ-
ent measures. For instance, multiplying model C (days per week) by five
produces similar coefficients as multiplying model B (hrs per week) by four.
The results are largely consistent even with children fixed effects although
not all are statistically significant.
The positive association between maternal employment and children’s weight
does not necessarily imply an adverse health outcome for all children. For
instance, for every 10 hours a mother works per week, a child is 1.1 percent-
age points less likely to be underweight (columns (3)). Since a weight gain is
beneficial for underweight children’s health, maternal employment likely has
a differing health consequence depending on children’s initial weight status.
Since the OLS model often suffers from an endogeneity issue, we cannot
infer causality from the finding. Mothers who work a greater number of hours
likely have children who are also exposed to adverse environments. In the
US, children from low-income families are more likely to consume junk food
frequently and have mothers who work longer hours. Therefore, we need an
exogenous shock to the number of maternal work hours in order to estimate
the causal effect of maternal employment. In the next section, we present
results from using the DD strategy.
4.5.2 The effect of maternal employment on childhood
adiposity: DD
In order to examine the effect of maternal employment, we first examine how
the reform changed the number of hours worked as well as yearly wage. A
simple difference in number of hours worked per week before and after the
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treatment in Table 4.3 shows that parents in the public sector experienced
a larger reduction in work hours (six to eight hours) compared to the pri-
vate sector (four to six hours) or self-employed parents (two to three hours).
On the other hand, Table 4.3 indicates an increase in yearly wage for work-
ers across all sectors with the largest increase for public sector mothers and
private sector fathers. One thing to note is that Table 4.3 only represents
a simple difference in means without controlling for any differences among
groups. Therefore, in Table 4.4 we explore the change in yearly wage and
work hours in a DD framework. The average hours worked per week declined
for the treatment group with a greater reduction experienced by public sector
workers (Panel A). Panel B shows that yearly wage declined for the treat-
ment group with a greater reduction for private sector workers. Nevertheless,
the estimates are not statistically significant in most cases. Therefore, it is
difficult to definitively conclude whether the treatment group worker’s wage
increased or decreased compared to the control group as a result of the re-
form. The size of a reduction in work hours and yearly wage, however, is
similar across mothers and fathers.
In contrast to our OLS estimates, the DD estimates indicate that children
whose mothers reduced the number of hours worked gained weight. Although
model A (without any control variables) of Table 4.5 shows that maternal
employment has no effect on any outcome except ZBMI, the baseline model
B demonstrates that probability of overweight or obesity increased by three
percentage points for children from the treatment group compared with those
from the control group after the reform (column (2)). Considering that ap-
proximately 10 percent of children in the sample are overweight or obese the
effect is fairly significant. The BMI of children from the treatment group
also increased by 0.2% of a standard deviation (column (4)). Children from
the treatment group were 3 percentage points less likely to be underweight,
implying a beneficial impact of the reform.11
The finding is robust to various specifications. When we include or ex-
clude variables from the baseline model B, the DD estimates remain con-
sistent (model C through model E of Table 4.5). Controlling for paternal
employment, yearly trend, or both hardly affects the size of the estimates.
Moreover, the finding is robust to the models using alternative measures of
11Since the post-reform outcomes are measured in 1997 and 2000, we are estimating a
short run impact of the reform.
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adiposity, such as adiposity status determined using the BMI cutoff specific
for Chinese children, triceps skin fold thickness, or upper arm fat area esti-
mates (Table 4.6).12 The estimates from models A to E are mostly positive
indicating an increase in the treatment group’s adiposity after the reform.
Robustness checks in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 reaffirm our main finding.
Table 4.7 confirms the absence of a pre-reform trend of the treatment versus
control group. All of the coefficients before the reform are small and not
statistically significant, hence, the DD estimates are driven by the post-
reform coefficients. Table 4.8 tests if a potential confounding factor is driving
our result. Excluding all of the mothers who switched employment status
during the sample periods increases the size of our coefficients slightly (model
B of Table 4.8). In order to exclude all mothers who may have been affected
by the SOE retrenchment, we created a sample excluding any mothers who
were employed in the state sector and became unemployed during the sample
periods in model C. In a more conservative manner, we then exclude all of the
mothers employed in the state sector from sample in model D. Both samples
result in coefficients that are similar to the baseline coefficients although some
are not as precisely estimated because of a smaller sample size. Finally, we
exclude any mother who switched among three employment sectors (public,
private, and self-employed) in model E. The resulting coefficients are larger
than the baseline and are statistically significant.
A closer look at the finding reveals that the DD estimate is driven by the
treatment group children’s relatively faster weight gain compared with the
control group. The bottom panel in Figure 4.4 shows that all children ex-
perienced a reduction in rate of overweight or obesity after the reform. We
believe that such a reduction is generated by a particular time period in child
development. The majority of children in the sample, with the average age
of 10, are entering puberty. Children experience a growth spurt and conse-
quentially a brief reduction in obesity rates during this time period.13 What
is intriguing about Figure 4.4 is that treatment group children experienced a
slower decline in rate of overweight or obesity compared with control group
children. The top two panels of Figure 4.4 demonstrates that treatment
12We do not include normed values in Table 4.6 since (1) there are no standardized cut
off values for TS & UFE (2) the existing cut off values are not available for children under
7 years old (3) no Chinese-specific cut off values are available.
13Obesity status is determined by BMI, which divides weight by height. A growth spurt,
therefore, temporarily lowers BMI and thus the overall obesity rates.
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group children experienced a faster weight gain than control group children,
although both groups experienced a similar height trend.
We propose two mechanisms that could explain how a reduction in mater-
nal labor supply leads to children’s weight gain. First is a change in household
income. Although the estimates on yearly wage from Table 4.4 are not statis-
tically significant, they are negative. A decline in financial resources lowers
a family’s budget, forcing them to cut spending on a child’s extracurricular
activities or to substitute to cheaper and unhealthy food. In short, a re-
duction in number of hours worked might have resulted in children’s weight
gain through a reduction in family income. An alternative explanation is
that a reduction in work hours induced parental behavior changes which led
to children’s weight gain. Previous research shows an association between
maternal hours on household chores and children’s body weight (Cawley and
Liu, 2012).
Table 4.9 suggests that mothers spent more time on household chores and
children consumed more calories after the reform. Column (1) indicates that
a greater number of treatment group mothers began cooking (3.3 percent-
age points) and devoted more time in cooking (15 minutes longer) after the
reform. Fathers, however, did not allocate their extra time on household
chores. Most of the coefficients are negative and statistically not significant
for fathers in Table 4.9. The finding is consistent with Rudolf and Cho (2011),
who find that women allocate their extra time on household chores, whereas
men primarily spend it on recreational activities in Korea. Treatment group
children consumed more calories, especially from fat and protein after the
reform.
Our evidence suggests that a change in maternal behavior is largely re-
sponsible for children’s higher caloric intake and the resulting weight gain.
Studies in the US generally show that an increase in maternal time on house
chores leads to children’s weight loss not a weight gain. We believe that the
observed mechanism is a uniquely Chinese characteristic. While more time
cooking at home is associated with a substitution away from less healthy fast
food in the US, it is associated with higher caloric intake in China. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that Chinese mothers spend their extra time cooking and
feeding more food in a belief that a chubby child equates a healthy child.14
14Most of the children in the sample were born under the China’s one child policy.
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Finally, the effect of maternal employment is heterogeneous across children
in China. Consistent with the findings in the US, boys, younger children,
and children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are affected more by a
change in maternal employment than their counterparts (Table 4.10). More-
over, perhaps uniquely to China, children in urban areas are affected more
compared with those in rural areas. The heterogeneous effect of maternal
employment on rural versus urban children may be driven by a difference in
parenting styles and types of foods that are readily available. For instance, a
reduction in maternal work hours likely generates an increased consumption
of fast food by increasing leisure time in urban areas, whereas such fast food
establishments are not as easily accessible in rural areas.
The literature in developed countries generally finds a modest role, if any,
a father plays in children’s adiposity (Cawley and Liu, 2012; Courtemanche,
2009; Greve, 2011; Phipps et al., 2006). In China, we speculate that the role
of the mother is also much more crucial than the father because a mother
shoulders most household chores and childcare. However, it is important to
discuss the role of father in this paper since the reform affected both male and
female workers. The DD estimate using a father’s treatment status presents
the result parallel to that of using a mother’s. Furthermore, when we de-
fine alternative treatment groups (comparing children with one wage earning
parent or two wage earning parents to those with self-employed parents), we
find a significant effect only when both parents are wage earners.15 However,
it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion regarding the role of paternal
employment because of (1) an occupational matching in a Chinese marriage
market (2) a lack of evidence on the mechanism. Since there is a high corre-
lation between a married couple’s occupation, it is difficult to distinguish the
effect of one parent from the other. It is also unclear through which channel a
father affects children’s adiposity. A reduction in family income generated by
a decline in paternal employment could be one of the mechanisms, but is not
so evident in Table 4.4. In addition, Table 4.9 indicates that the treatment
group fathers did not change their behaviors after the reform.
15The results are presented in the Table 4.11.
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4.6 Conclusion
Although a number of studies on children’s adiposity has been growing in the
US, there has been a relatively lack of studies in China. As a developing coun-
try like China experiences a rapid growth in obesity rates, understanding the
main factor behind such a phenomenon has become increasingly important.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of maternal employment on chil-
dren’s adiposity using a labor market reform in China. Consistent with
the findings in the US, the relationship between maternal employment and
childhood obesity exhibit a positive relationship. However, the DD estimate
implies a contrasting result. When mothers reduce their labor supply in
China, children become more likely to be overweight or obese. The result
is robust to various specifications and samples. Further investigation shows
that mothers allocate their extra time on household chores such as cooking,
which leads to children’s weight gain. The weight gain has detrimental health
effect on children who become overweight or obese but a beneficial effect on
those who no longer are underweight. Considering that a great percentage of
children in the sample are underweight than overweight or obese, a reduction
in maternal labor supply overall had a positive impact on children.
The main finding of this paper highlights the importance of understanding
cultural context in the interpretation of results. The employment rate of
urban Chinese women decreased from 97% in 1988 to 81% in 2004 (Zhang
et al, 2008). Surprisingly, the drop in female labor force participation rate
coincided with a rise in childhood obesity in China. From this perspective,
the findings in this paper are consistent with the observed aggregate trend
of female employment and children’s adiposity in China. The phenomenon,
however, contradicts what happened in countries like the US. Our finding
implies that findings in developed countries may not necessarily extend to
developing countries or countries with a different cultural norm.
One of the drawbacks of the paper is that we cannot completely rule out
the role of paternal employment. The DD estimate suggests a potential effect
of fathers on children’s weight but not through the mechanisms we discuss
in Section 5. We cannot explore other possible mechanisms because of the
data limitation. One such example is the role of childcare settings. The
reform implies a re-arrangement of parental and nonparental childcare. The
potential reassignment of nonparental childcare hours to parental hours may
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have led to results in the previous section. More importantly, fathers may
have played a role through this mechanism because of the offsetting behaviors
of spouses. However, we cannot test the mechanism since since the CHNS
only surveyed preschoolers on childcare related questions and the information
is largely missing. The role of paternal employment on children’s adiposity
and the associated mechanisms are an important question open to future
research.
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Figure 4.1: Maternal labor supply
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Notes: Authors’ own calculations. The sample includes only full-time (who work at least 35 hours per
week) wage earning mothers. The red dashed line indicates the year that the reform occurred.
Figure 4.2: Maternal labor supply by treatment status (with 95% CIs)
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Source: Authors’ own calculations. The sample includes only full-time (who work at least 35 hours per
week) mothers. The treatment group consists of mothers who are wage earners while the control group
consists of self-employed mothers. The red dashed line indicates the year that the reform occurred. The
range plot shows the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.3: Maternal labor supply by three employment sectors (with 95%
Cls)
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Source: Authors’ own calculations. The sample includes only full-time (who work at least 35 hours per
week) mothers. The “private” group consists of mothers who are wage earners in a private sector while the
“public” group consists of mothers who are wage earners in a public sector. The “self-employed” group
consists of self-employed mothers. The red dashed line indicates the year that the reform occurred. The
range plot shows the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.4: A relative contribution of height versus weight in adiposity trend
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Control Treatment Diff
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Child Characteristics
% Obese 0.01 0.03 -0.02
BMI≥85th percentile 0.04 0.09 -0.05
% Underweight 0.17 0.09 0.08**
% Male 0.56 0.52 0.04
Age 10.63 10.17 0.45
% Han nationality 0.92 0.91 0.00
Panel B. Family Characteristics
Mom age 35.56 35.85 -0.29
Mom years of schooling 6.94 9.06 -2.12***
Dad age 37.30 37.87 -0.56
Dad years of schooling 8.21 9.95 -1.74***
Household size 4.74 3.81 0.93***
Mom yearly wage (Year 2009 CNY) 5219.54 5548.61 -329.07
Dad yearly wage (Year 2009 CNY) 8765.95 7395.84 1370.11*
Mom hrs/yr worked (divided by 1,000) 1.78 2.13 -0.35***
Dad hrs/yr worked (divided by 1,000) 1.94 2.09 -0.15*
Dad self-employed 0.59 0.08 0.51***
Panel C. Parental Behaviors
% Mom cooks 0.76 0.81 -0.05
% Mom buys food 0.61 0.75 -0.13**
% Mom does laundry 0.87 0.94 -0.08**
Mom total min cooking 75.06 109.82 -34.77
Mom total min buying food 81.67 90.37 -8.7
Mom total min doing laundry 34.39 40.77 -6.38
% Dad cooks 0.13 0.37 -0.23***
% Dad buys food 0.33 0.36 -0.03
% Dad does laundry 0.09 0.27 -0.17***
Dad total min cooking 13.77 50.46 -36.68
Dad total min buying food 76.70 50.20 26.5
Dad total min doing laundry 2.05 7.68 -5.63**
Panel D. Child Nutrition
Energy (Kcal) 1827.78 1962.07 -134.29*
Carbohydrate (g) 283.64 270.43 13.21
Fat (g) 52.49 70.47 -17.99***
Protein (g) 54.95 61.59 -6.64**
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 In all of the regression models, we include dummies for any
missing control variables, however, we do not provide summary statistics for them since most are close
to zero. Parental behaviors “Cooking”, “Buying Food”, and “Laundry” are obtained directly from the
survey and indicate a percentage of parents who engage in the activity. The variables “Min Cooking”,
”Min Buying Food”, and “Min Doing Laundry” denote total minutes per day a respondent engages in
each activity. Child nutrition variables “Energy”, “Carbohydrate”, “Fat”, and “Protein” are obtained
directly from the survey and are a 3-day average.
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Table 4.3: The effect of the reform on parents’ wages and work hours by
a mother’s employment sector
Pre-95 Post-95 Diff
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Treatment (private sector)
Mom hrs/wk worked (divided by 10) 4.87 4.28 -0.59***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.15)
Dad hrs/wk worked (divided by 10) 4.89 4.47 -0.42**
(0.08) (0.12) (0.14)
Mom’s wage (year 2009 CNY) 4435.58 7022.56 2586.97***
(265.69) (330.79) (421.52)
Dad’s wage (year 2009 CNY) 5965.85 11233.08 5267.24***
(304.97) (870.20) (811.45)
Panel B. Treatment (public sector)
Mom hrs/wk worked (divided by 10) 4.73 3.92 -0.81***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Dad hrs/wk worked (divided by 10) 4.66 4.05 -0.61***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
Mom’s wage (year 2009 CNY) 3574.80 7796.74 4221.94***
(86.66) (329.60) (285.46)
Dad’s wage (year 2009 CNY) 4187.95 8991.95 4804.00***
(154.93) (361.34) (348.19)
Panel C. Control (self-employed)
Mom hrs/wk worked (divided by 10) 4.05 3.76 -0.29
(0.28) (0.27) (0.40)
Dad hrs/wk worked (divided by 10) 4.10 3.90 -0.20
(0.26) (0.28) (0.39)
Mom’s wage (year 2009 CNY) 4911.75 6523.16 1611.41*
(499.15) (501.70) (713.81)
Dad’s wage (year 2009 CNY) 5617.31 10070.43 4453.12***
(459.50) (930.03) (1101.35)
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 The table presents a simple difference in variables (number
of hours worked, yearly wage, a child’s weight status) before and after the 1995 policy reform.
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Table 4.4: A change in the treatment group parent’s wage
and hours worked after the reform
Mother Father Average
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Hours per week
wage earner×post95 -0.722** -0.760** -0.741***
(0.328) (0.297) (0.260)
private×post95 -0.612* -0.711** -0.662**
(0.339) (0.307) (0.269)
public×post95 -0.806** -0.799*** -0.803***
(0.335) (0.303) (0.266)
Panel B. Yearly wage
wage earner×post95 -1160.211 -2271.466 -1715.838
(970.772) (1541.619) (1048.900)
private×post95 -1716.560* -1970.149 -1843.355*
(1000.879) (1594.262) (1084.982)
public×post95 -730.267 -2504.322 -1617.294
(987.822) (1573.464) (1070.828)
N 1334 1334 1334
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All of the regression models include
child characteristics (age, gender, nationality) as well as family characteristics
(parent’s age and education, household size), missing variable indicators, regional
dummies, and child fixed effects.
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Table 4.5: The treatment group children’s adiposity outcomes compared to the control
group children’s after the reform: DD estimates
Under-
Obese ≥ 85th weight ZBMI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Without control variables 0.010 0.022 -0.013 0.130**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.064)
B. Baseline 0.019* 0.032** -0.028* 0.201***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.053)
C. Paternal Employment (total n of hrs per yr) 0.024 0.047* -0.011 0.120
(0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.085)
D. Yearly Trend 0.018* 0.031** -0.028* 0.197***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.053)
E. Paternal Employment & Yearly Trend 0.021 0.040 -0.009 0.096
(0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.085)
Average Rate 0.04 0.10 0.12 -0.37
Region Indicators x x x x
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 The model A includes no control variables. The model B through E include
child characteristics (age, gender, nationality) as well as family characteristics (parent’s age and education, household
size), missing variable indicators, regional dummies, and child fixed effects.
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Table 4.7: Investigating the existence of pre-trend differences in
adiposity outcomes between the treatment and control groups
Under-
Obese ≥ 85th weight ZBMI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wage earner × year 1989 0.018 0.011 0.014 0.070
(0.019) (0.028) (0.030) (0.096)
wage earner × year 1991 0.007 -0.018 0.017 -0.041
(0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.076)
wage earner × year 1997 0.029** 0.029 -0.003 0.131*
(0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.074)
wage earner × year 2000 0.017 0.023 -0.041 0.281***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.026) (0.081)
Average Rate 0.04 0.10 0.12 -0.37
Region Indicators x x x x
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 The regression model includes child characteris-
tics (age, gender, nationality) as well as family characteristics (parent’s age and education,
household size), missing variable indicators, regional dummies, year dummies, and child
fixed effects. Each coefficient represents an interaction between treatment and year dum-
mies. Year 1993 is the omitted year.
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Table 4.8: Robustness Checks for the DD estimates
Under-
Obese ≥ 85th weight ZBMI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Baseline 0.019* 0.032** -0.028* 0.201***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.053)
N 7400 7400 7400 7400
B. Exclude mothers who switched employment 0.021* 0.051*** -0.052** 0.282***
status (0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.064)
N 5618 5618 5618 5618
C. Exclude mothers employed in state sector 0.019* 0.028* -0.026 0.200***
& became unemployed (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.055)
N 7244 7244 7244 7244
D. Exclude all mothers employed in state sector 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.096
(0.013) (0.019) (0.021) (0.065)
N 6679 6679 6679 6679
E. Exclude mothers who switched sectors 0.035*** 0.047** -0.047** 0.293***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.022) (0.069)
N 6040 6040 6040 6040
Average Rate 0.04 0.10 0.12 -0.37
Region Indicators x x x x
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All of the regression models include child characteristics (age, gender, nationality)
as well as family characteristics (parent’s age and education, household size), missing variable indicators, regional dummies,
and child fixed effects.
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Table 4.10: Heterogeneous effect of maternal employment on childhood obesity:
DD estimates
HH Inc Maternal Urban
Gender Age per Capita Education Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Normalized BMI (ZBMI)
Male < 9yrs < 25th < 6yrs Urban
wage earner×post95 0.344*** 0.384* 1.663** 0.462* 0.206*
(0.098) (0.231) (0.818) (0.242) (0.111)
Mean -0.39 -0.19 -0.29 -0.35 -0.31
N 3274 3006 1607 2796 1296
Female ≥ 9yrs ≥ 75th ≥ 6yrs Rural
wage earner×post95 0.246** 0.160 0.039 0.191** 0.306***
(0.096) (0.104) (0.141) (0.081) (0.101)
Mean -0.41 -0.61 -0.37 -0.42 -0.43
N 2766 3034 1273 3244 4744
Panel B. BMI ≥ 85th percentile
Male < 9yrs < 25th < 6yrs Urban
wage earner×post95 0.045 0.154** 0.401 0.078 0.060*
(0.028) (0.073) (0.269) (0.074) (0.031)
Mean 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.10
N 3274 3006 1607 2796 1296
Female ≥ 9yrs ≥ 75th ≥ 6yrs Rural
wage earner×post95 0.055** 0.009 -0.004 0.028 0.034
(0.028) (0.022) (0.041) (0.022) (0.029)
Mean 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.10
N 2766 3034 1273 3244 4744
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All of the regression models include child characteristics (age,
gender, nationality) as well as family characteristics (parent’s age and education, household size), missing
variable indicators, regional dummies, and child fixed effects.
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Table 4.11: DD estimates using alternative treatment groups
Under-
Obese ≥ 85th weight ZBMI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Treatment = wage earner dad
treatment×post95 0.037*** 0.033* -0.043** 0.215***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.058)
Panel B. Treatment1 = wage earner mom or dad
Treatment2 = wage earner mom & dad
treatment1×post95 0.031** 0.012 -0.016 0.061
(0.016) (0.023) (0.026) (0.080)
treatment2×post95 0.042*** 0.049** -0.056** 0.318***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.023) (0.072)
N 6017 6017 6017 6017
Region Indicators x x x x
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All of the regression models include child character-
istics (age, gender, nationality) as well as family characteristics (parent’s age and education,
household size), missing variable indicators, regional dummies, and child fixed effects.
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